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This dissertation is a thorough examination of CEO overconfidence, and consists of two essays.  
The first essay focuses on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and the adjustment speed of firm 
financial policy.  No research has examined the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm financial 
policies adjustment speed. Previous studies focus solely on the adjustment speed of leverage, we are motivated 
to examine the adjustment of firm leverage and the adjustment of cash holdings together because there is 
evidence that firm leverage and firm liquidity are related. We find that CEO overconfidence places an 
important role in adjusting firm leverage and cash. Specifically, overconfident CEOs speed up (slow down) 
the adjustment of firm leverage when it is above (below) target leverage. In addition, overconfident CEOs 
speed up (slow down) the adjustment of firm cash holding when it is below (above) the estimated target. 
Consistent with the prediction of Acharya et al. (2007), our analysis suggests that cash and reduced leverage 
serve different purposes in the eyes of overconfident CEOs.  Specifically, we find evidence that overconfident 
CEOs of financially constrained firms that have high (low) hedging needs hoard cash (reduce debt). 
Although extensive research has been carried out to find the optimal inside debt ratio, no study has examined 
the association between deviations from the optimal inside debt ratio and the firm’s risk taking behavior. The 
second essay is to fill out the gap, try to find out what is the effect of Inside debt deviation on risk-taking 
activities of firms with overconfident CEOs. The second essay is the first paper to examine the effects of 
deviations of inside debt and CEO overconfidence on firm value. Our results show that positive deviations of 
inside debt mitigate the risk taking behaviors of firms with overconfident CEOs. We find that CEO 
overconfidence is negatively related to firm leverage. This result indicates that overconfident CEOs will 
decrease firm leverage under both positive and negative deviations in inside debt. However, we do find that 
the amount of the decrease is smaller when the inside debt deviation is negative. we find that overconfident 
CEOs tend to lower firm cash levels. We also find that if a CEO’s inside debt is above the target level, the 
amount of the decrease is smaller. However, the results are nonsignificant. We confirm the positive relation 
between deviations from the target inside debt level and firm value. Our results also show that CEO 
overconfidence has a positive effect on firm value. This positive effect is more significant for positive 
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ESSAY 1: CEO OVERCONFIDENCE AND ADJUSTMENT SPEEDS OF CASH AND 
LEVERAGE: EVIDENCE ON CASH IS NOT NEGATIVE DEBT 
 
1. Introduction 
A growing body of research suggests that a considerable percentage of top corporate 
executives exhibit symptoms of overconfidence in their decisions (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 
2012; Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey, 2013). Some studies find evidence implying that CEO 
overconfidence is undesirable for the firm because overconfident managers are associated with 
corporate investment distortions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), value-destroying mergers 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008), or excess entry in a market (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Other 
studies report findings suggesting that CEO overconfidence is beneficial to the firm because 
overconfident CEOs are associated with higher levels of firm innovation (Hirshleifer, Low and 
Teoh, 2012) and greater effectiveness in leading the firm in facing external shocks (Galasso and 
Simcoe, 2010).  
Prior studies have largely focused on the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm investment 
activity and few have examined the relation between CEO overconfidence and corporate financial 
policies (Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011). Understanding corporate financial 
policies is a major challenge for financial economists. Despite distinct approaches such as agency 
cost or market imperfections have contributed to explaining a significant portion of the observed 
variation in the debt-equity choice of the firm, there is evidence that conventional theories cannot 
fully explain firm-specific persistence in corporate financial policy (Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender, 2008). Some researchers suggest that the behavioral bias of managers may be related to 
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the remaining variation in the firm’s financial decision making (Malmendier et al., 2011; Ben-
David et al., 2013).  
A recent strand of research on corporate financial policy examines the speed of adjustment 
(SOA) of the firm’s capital structure (Hovakimian et al., 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; 
Oztekin and Flannery, 2012; Devos et al., 2017). It has been generally argued that capital structure 
decisions are dynamic and firms make periodic adjustments to achieve optimal leverage. Results 
of existing studies largely point to the adjustment process as a rational decision determined by 
careful evaluations of costs and benefits. Given the growing evidence of the association between 
CEO overconfidence and corporate financial decision making (Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier et 
al., 2011), we expand the current research to examine the relation between  CEO overconfidence 
and the adjustment speed of firm leverage. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on the adjustment 
speed of firm leverage, we also examine the relation between CEO overconfidence and the 
adjustment speed of the firm’s cash holdings. We are motivated to examine the adjustment of firm 
leverage and the adjustment of cash holdings together because there is evidence that firm leverage 
and firm liquidity are related (Opler et al., 1999, Bates et al., 2009). Examining the SOA of 
leverage without also examining the SOA of cash is thus incomplete. In addition, a number of 
researchers argue that cash and (negative) debt are substitutable (Kim et al., 1998; Baskin, 1987; 
John, 1993).  This line of research further stresses the importance to examine the SOA of leverage 
and the SOA of cash together as the two may be related.  
We find a number of important results in this study. First, our results show highly 
overconfident CEOs speed up (slow down) the adjustment speed of cash if the firm’s cash holding 
is below (above) the optimal balance. Second, highly overconfident CEOs speed up (slow down) 
the adjustment speed of firm leverage if the firm’s leverage is above (below) target leverage. Third, 
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the results suggest that low overconfidence CEOs are conservative relative to highly overconfident 
CEOs in adjusting firm leverage and firm cash holding. Fourth, we find evidence suggesting that 
the tendency of highly overconfident CEOs to hoard cash and reduce debt is not a manifestation 
of the cash is equal to negative debt phenomenon. Based on the prediction of prior studies (Acharya 
et al., 2007), our results imply that overconfident CEOs treat cash and negative debt differently as 
if the two serve different purposes in investment activity in the face of uncertainty. Specifically, 
we find that overconfident CEOs of financially constrained firms that have high (low) hedging 
needs tend to hoard cash (reduce debt). While our results support earlier hypotheses (Malmendier 
et al., 2011) that overconfident CEOs prefer internal funds over external financing and the CEOs 
exhibit debt conservatism, our results may also be explainable by overconfident CEOs’ resentment 
of the monitoring imposed by shareholders or debtholders. That is, several aspects of the 
personality traits of overconfident CEOs, instead of merely the tendency to overestimate their 
ability and underestimate risk, may be affecting the firm’s financial policy.  
Our study contributes to the strand of literature on the adjustment speed of leverage by 
showing the importance of investigating the adjustment speed of cash simultaneously. Our results 
imply that the adjustment of leverage and the adjustment of cash are related, given the fact that 
prior studies have considerable evidence that leverage is one of the determinants of firm cash 
holdings. Our investigation adds to the literature by showing that CEO overconfidence is 
associated with the adjustment speeds of cash and leverage. Our study is also related to the 
literature on cash and debt(negative) substitutability. We provide evidence supporting the view of 
Acharya et al. (2007) that cash is not negative debt. Despite our results are consistent with the 
opinion of Malmendier et al. (2011) that overconfident CEOs prefer internal funds over external 
financing and the CEOs also exhibit debt conservatism, our results further suggest that adjustments 
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of firm leverage and cash are also related to the personality traits of overconfident CEOs that their 
debt decisions may also reflect their strong dislike of monitoring imposed by lenders.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We review the related literature and 
present our empirical hypotheses in section 2. Section 3 describes key variable construction and 
the sample Section 4 presents the analysis and discusses the results. Section 5 summarizes and 
concludes the paper. 
2.1. Related literature 
2.1.1. CEO overconfidence 
One commonly observed finding in the psychology literature is that people tend to be 
overconfident (e.g., Kidd, 1970; Moore, 1977). Financial economists find that CEOs are no 
exception to this rule (Malmendier and Tate, 2005 & 2008; Ben-David et al., 2013). In addition, it 
has been argued that overconfident managers are more likely to become CEOs (Goel and Thakor, 
2008). Researchers have largely concluded that overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate their 
ability (Braumeister, 1998; Gervais et al. 2009, and Goel and Thakor 2008) and underestimate the 
riskiness of future cash flows (Hackbarth, 2008).  
The behavioral literature has evidence that overconfident persons enjoy control (Stotz and 
Nitzsch, 2005). Overconfident individuals tend to have enormous pride and there is a substantial 
literature highlighting the egos of business executives (Hiller and Hamrick, 2005; Roll, 1986). In 
addition, it has been found that overconfident individuals are prone to have a self-importance bias 
and they tend to disregard the opinion of others (Miller and Ross, 1975). Collectively, the above 
suggests that overconfident CEOs are strong-willed individuals who dislike being interfered. 
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A survey of CFO Outlook conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001) provides evidence of 
a direct role for managerial overconfidence in financing decisions. According to the survey, prior 
to the end of the technology bubble of 2000, 70% of senior executives considered their company 
stock undervalued and 67% said that misvaluation was an important factor in the decision to alter 
firm leverage. However, conflicting empirical results on the relation between CEO overconfidence 
and firm financial policy have been reported in prior studies. Malmendier et al. (2011) examine 
the effects of CEO overconfidence on corporate financial policies. The authors find that 
overconfident CEOs issue less equity in financing decisions and prefer internal financing because 
they perceive the cost of external funds excessively expensive. Malmendier et al. argue that 
overconfident CEOs can lead to debt levels that are too low relative to available tax benefits. In 
addition, they find that overconfident CEOs have a marginally significant association with higher 
leverage only when the firm has a financing deficit.1 Consistent with Malmendier et al. (2011), 
Atkas et al. (2019) find that firms with overconfident CEOs avoid external financing as it is 
perceived to be relatively more expensive, and rely more on internal funds to finance their 
investment opportunities. In contrast, Ben-David et al. (2013) find that overconfident managers 
use more debt because they overestimate the firm’s ability to meet its debt obligations, and are less 
likely to pay dividends and more likely to buy back shares. The authors also report that 
overconfident managers tend to prefer long-term debt over short-term instruments. However, 
Huang et al. (2016) find that overconfident CEOs tend to adopt a shorter debt maturity structure 
by using a higher proportion of short-term debt and that this behavior of overconfident CEOs is 
not deterred by the high liquidity risk associated with such a financing strategy.  
 
1 The amount raised through debt or equity issues to cover expenditures (Malmendier et al. (2011), page 1697). 
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2.1.2. Speed of adjustment of firm leverage 
Traditional trade-off theory suggests that there exists an optimal capital structure that 
maximizes firm value and therefore, firms adjust their debt levels to their optimal levels when 
deviations occur. Survey evidence supports this notion as 81% of firm CFOs claim to have a target 
range for debt-equity ratio (Graham and Harvey, 2001). The earlier work seeking to determine the 
speed of adjustment of firm leverage generally assumes a smooth optimal adjustment mechanism 
over the adjustment period. Later studies argue that there are several costs (security issuance cost 
and/or opportunity cost) and/or firm characteristics that may affect the speed at which firms move 
towards their target leverage, making the capital structure adjustment dynamic in nature 
(Korajczyk and Levy 2003; Shivadasani and Stefanescu 2010; Faulkender et al., 2012). It has been 
suggested that firms can only partially adjust toward their target leverage due to firm-specific 
characteristics such as firm size, liquidity, cash flow, distance between observed and target 
leverage, profitability, tangibility, and growth opportunities (Faulkender et al., 2008; Mukherjee 
and Mahakud, 2010). Recent studies suggest that macroeconomic factors (Cook and Tang, 2010; 
Drobetz et al., 2015; Antzoulatos et al., 2016) and country-level institutional factors (Elsas and 
Florysiak 2011; Öztekin and Flannery 2012; An, Li, and Yu 2015; Öztekin 2015) are also related 
to the speed of adjustment of firm leverage. It is generally argued that a firm will adjust its leverage 
ratio only if the benefits outweigh the adjustment costs, and the adjustment speed is lower when 
adjustment costs are higher. 
Speed of adjustment estimations for leverage differ significantly across prior studies 
despite researchers commonly concur that leverage exhibits mean reversion. For example, Fama 
& French (2002) report SOA between 7% and 15% for dividend payers versus non-dividend 
payers. Flannery & Rangan (2006) estimate an SOA of 35.5% per year, with a half-life of 1.6 
7 
 
years. It has been argued that the different estimation results are likely related to the different 
methodologies employed. For example, Flannery & Rangan (2006) use fixed effects models while 
Lemmon, Roberts, & Zender (2008) use the GMM regression technique.   
Expanding the literature on the relation between CEO overconfidence and firm financial 
policy, we argue that the adjustment speed of firm leverage is associated with CEO 
overconfidence. Given the conflicting empirical evidence in the literature that overconfident CEOs 
use more debt (Ben-David et al., 2013) and exhibit debt conservatism (Malmendier et al., 2011; 
Atkas et  al., 2019), we develop a pair of competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis is developed 
based on the argument of Ben-David et al. (2013) whereas the second hypothesis is based on the 
argument of Malmendier et al. (2011). 
Hypothesis 1: CEO overconfidence is positively (negatively) associated with the adjustment speed 
of firm leverage if the firm’s debt ratio is below (above) the estimated target. 
Hypothesis 2: CEO overconfidence is positively (negatively) associated with the adjustment speed 
of firm leverage if the firm’s debt ratio is above (below) the estimated target. 
2.2 Firm cash holdings and speed of adjustment 
The median cash ratio of firms in the US increased from 5.5% in 1980 to 13.3% in 2006 
(Bates et al., 2009). In the beginning of 2013, the S&P 500 firms held a total of $1.2 trillion in 
cash, more than the GDP of Mexico and South Korea added together. Researchers have 
documented significant evidence that large corporate cash stockpiles are associated with 
heightened agency problems (Jensen, 1986; Dittmar et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008). Cash 
stockpiles could draw unwanted attention from activist shareholders. For example, investor Carl 
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Icahn accumulated $1.5 billion of the shares of Apple Inc. in 2013 and pressed the firm to buy 
back more shares.  
Firms hold cash for transaction cost motives (Kim, Mauer & Sherman, 1998) and 
precautionary motives (Opler et al., 1999), among other reasons. Strong liquidity enables firms to 
have strategic advantages in the face of product market competition (Fresard, 2011). He and 
Wintoki (2016) find that firms with strong cash positions are associated with higher levels of 
research and development. Holding cash is not costless. Opler et al. (1999) point out that firms 
incur opportunity costs in holding cash. Excess cash holdings can lead to declines in firm value as 
agency problems escalate (Jensen, 1986; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al., 2008). 
Thus, an optimal cash level exists when the costs and benefits of holding cash are balanced. Cash 
holding models have included firm leverage as one of the factors that are associated with the 
optimal level of cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009), suggesting that 
corporate liquidity policy is related to firm leverage. It is thus reasonable that adjustments of firm 
leverage are related to adjustments of firm cash holding. Examining the SOA of leverage without 
considering the SOA of cash is therefore incomplete. 
The literature on the relation between CEO overconfidence and firm cash holdings is 
relatively scant and indirect. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that overconfident CEOs prefer 
cash and debt financing for acquisition activity. Malmendier et al. (2011) suggest that 
overconfident CEOs prefer internal funds to external financing as they consider external funds 
expensive. Ferris et al. (2013) provide evidence that overconfident CEOs use more cash to finance 
acquisitions than non-overconfident CEOs. Direct evidence of an association between managerial 
confidence and firm cash holdings is reported by Huang-Meier et al. (2016). Their results show 
find that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external funds and the managers hoard cash for 
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growth opportunities and save more cash in adverse conditions. Recently, Atkins et al. (2019) 
investigate the relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash. They find that cash 
holding is more valuable for firms with overconfident CEOs as the CEOs may underinvest given 
their tendency to view external financing as unduly costly. Collectively, the above studies suggest 
a positive relation between firm cash holdings and CEO overconfidence. As a result, we develop 
the following hypotheses 
Hypothesis 3: CEO overconfidence is positively (negatively) associated with the adjustment speed 
of cash holding if the firm’s cash level is below (above) the estimated target. 
3. Key variables 
3.1 Measuring CEO overconfidence 
The extant literature identifies overconfident CEOs as those who deliberately over-expose 
their personal wealth to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms (Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 
1991; Hall and Murphy, 2002). We follow Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and define a CEO 
as overconfident once he postpones exercising vested options that are at least 67% in the money. 
The 67% threshold is based on a calculation of Hall and Murphy (2002) that suggests that a failure 
to exercise an option that is 67% in the money implies a constant relative risk-aversion of three. 
Given that there is no detailed information on CEO options holdings and the exercise price of each 
granted option, we follow prior studies (Campbell et al., 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2012) in 
calculating an average moneyness of the CEO’s option portfolio for each year. First, for each CEO-
year, the average realizable value per option is calculated by dividing the total realizable value of 
the options by the number of options held by the CEO. The strike price is calculated as the fiscal 
year end stock price minus the average realizable value. The average moneyness of the options is 
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equal to the stock price divided by the estimated strike price minus 1. In these computations, only 
the vested options are included. CEO overconfidence is represented by a (0,1) dummy variable 
that has a value of one if the CEO is identified as overconfident, and is zero otherwise. Similar to 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012), the overconfidence measure of a CEO remains unchanged over the sample 
period because the personality trait is considered persistent. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) 
show that this measure of overconfidence works well after controlling for past stock return 
performance. In addition, Campbell et al. (2011) show that this measure of overconfidence 
generates results similar to those in Malmendier and Tate (2005). 
3.2 Measuring SOA of firm leverage 
We follow prior studies and begin by estimating the target capital structure of a firm (Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006; Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012, Devos et al., 2017). Specifically, target 
leverage is estimated using the following equation. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣*i,t+1=𝛽𝑋i,t+𝜀i,t     (1)  
where Lev* is the estimated target leverage ratio of the firm, X is a vector of firm and industry 
characteristics that are included in the regressions to estimate the target. The firm characteristics 
include profitability (EBIT/TA), growth opportunities (MB), nondebt tax shield (Dep/TA), firm 
size (LnTA), asset tangibility (FA/TA), research and development expenditures (R&D/TA), and 
industry median leverage. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A.  
In the next step, the following equation (equation (2)) is used to estimate the speed at which a firm 
makes partial adjustments towards its target within each period. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣i,t+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣i,t =  λ (Lev*i,t+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣i,t)+𝜀i,t+1 (2) 
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where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 represents a firm’s market leverage ratio (Flannery et al. 2006) at time t+1, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 
represents the firm’s market leverage ratio at time t, (Lev*𝑡+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡) represents the deviation from 
target leverage, and λ is the average annual leverage adjustment speed to the target. In our empirical 
analysis, we examine leverage deviations, LevDev, and CEO overconfidence, ConfidenceDummy 
(i.e., a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is  overconfident and zero otherwise), as an 
interaction variable. 
In a frictionless environment where information asymmetries, transaction costs, and other 
adjustment costs and/or benefits are absent, firms would always maintain their target leverage by 
making rapid adjustments to the debt ratio. In other words, in a perfect environment, the difference 
between the current and the previous period’s observed capital structure should be the same as the 
difference between target capital structure and the pervious period’s capital structure. Thus, 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 should be equal to Lev*𝑡+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡. However, in the presence of adjustment costs and/or 
benefits, Lev is not necessarily the same as Lev*. Firms may not fully adjust their capital structure 
to the target capital structure. Deviations from the target leverage may be adjusted partially. 
3.3 Measuring SOA of cash holdings 
Similar to the estimation of leverage adjustment speed, we start by estimating the firm’s target 
cash holding.  
Cash*i,t+1=αY𝑖,𝑡+𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (3)  
where Cash* is the estimated target cash ratio, Y is a vector of firm and industry characteristics 
that are included in the regressions to estimate the target. We follow the existing literature (Opler 
et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009) in choosing the Independent variables. Specifically, the Independent 
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variables include firm size, the Tobin’s Q, industry cash flow volatility, cash flow, net working 
capital, capital expenditures, leverage ratio, R&D expenditures, a dividend dummy, acquisition, 
and firm age.  
Then we follow the methodology of prior studies in estimating the adjustment speed of cash 
(Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012; Devos et al., 2017).  
Cashi,t+1−Cashi,t= θ (Cash*i,t+1−Cashi,t)+𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1  (4) 
The estimation procedure entails estimating the target cash ratio in a first stage regression and then 
regressing the subsequent change in the cash ratio during a year against the deviation in the current 
cash ratio from the target ratio at the beginning of the year. In the model, Cash𝑡+1 represents a 
firm’s cash ratio at time t+1, Cash𝑡 represents the firm’s cash ratio at time t, (Cash*𝑡+1−Cash𝑡) 
measures the deviation from target cash, and θ is the average annual cash adjustment speed to the 
target cash.  
3.4 Data and sample selection 
To construct our sample, we use two datasets that are available from Wharton Research 
Data Services. We retrieve firm financial variables from Compustat, and we use Execucomp to 
obtain CEO-related information. The initial sample consists of the intersection of firms that are 
included in both databases. The sample period is between 1993 and 2017. We exclude ADRs, 
utility firms (SIC 4900-4999), and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999). We also delete observations 
with missing data on key variables (for example,  cash/total assets). We winsorize all the key 
variables at the first and 99th percentiles. The final sample in this study consists of 2,731 firms, 
5,570 CEOs, and a total observations of 29,580. Our sample size is comparable to prior studies on 
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CEO overconfidence. For example, Aktas et al. (2019) report a sample size of 12,105 firm-year 
observations between 1993-2013 in a study that examines the relation between CEO 
overconfidence and the value of firm cash holdings. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A.  
4. Results 
4.1 Sample descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. Included are the mean, median, 
standard deviation, and 25th and 75th percentiles. Average cash ratios of firms in the sample are 
consistent with those reported in the literature. The mean (median) cash/total assets ratio is 0.1017 
(0.0680). The mean (median) cash/net assets is 0.1507 (0.0732), and the mean (median) cash/sales 
ratio is 0.2639 (0.0665). Regarding the measures of investment activity, the mean (median) capital 
expenditures (CAPEX_TA) is 0.0584 (0.0419), R&D/TA has a mean (median) of 0.0503 (0.0268). 
Book leverage has a mean of 0.2099 and a median of 0.0.1827.The firms in the sample are 
relatively large, with a mean (median) log(total assets) of 7.1430 (7.0207). Tobin’s Q has a mean 
of 2.0303 and a median of 1.6056. Cash flow, measured as EBITDA/TA, has a mean (median) of 
0.0823 (0.0864).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.2. Main results 
4.2.1 SOA of leverage 
To examine the relation between CEO overconfidence and the adjustment speed of 
leverage, we follow the methodology of prior studies (Byoun, 2008; Faullkender et al., 2012; 
Devos et al. , 2017) by adding an overconfidence dummy variable to the model. The advantage of 
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this procedure is that it is suitable for estimating interactive effects in adjustment speeds, which is 
what Byoun (2008) does in his model. The modified model has the following specification: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣i,t+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣i,t =∝0+𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣+𝛽2Confidence𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣×𝐶onfidenceD𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
 (5) 
LevDev is deviation from target leverage (Lev*𝑡+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡). The model examines partial adjustments 
of firm leverage towards its target within each period. We expect 𝛽3 to be significantly different 
from zero if CEO overconfidence is associated with the adjustment speed (SOA) of leverage.    
Table 2 reports regression results using equation (5). In Table 2, the result of model (1) 
shows that without considering the effect of CEO confidence, SOA of leverage is 21.35% per year. 
That is, firms close 21.35% of the gap between current and target leverage within one year. In 
other words, firms on average take 4.68 years to close deviations from target leverage. With the 
effect of CEO confidence taken into consideration, the result of model (2) shows that SOA of 
leverage is increased to 22.75% per year. The coefficient on LevDev*ConfidenceDummy is 
significant at the one percent level. The source of the increase in SOA of leverage, however, is 
associated with CEOs who are highly overconfident. As can be seen by comparing the results of 
models (3), (4), and (5), the SOA of leverage of firms with highly overconfident CEOs is 25.35% 
whereas the SOA of leverage of firms with low overconfidence CEOs is 21.20%. That is, highly 
overconfident CEOs significantly speed up the adjustment speed of leverage whereas low 
overconfidence CEOs marginally slow down the adjustment speed of leverage. The results imply 
that it takes an average of 3.94 (4.72) years for a high- (low-) overconfidence CEO to adjust the 
firm’s leverage to its target. Economically, highly overconfident CEOs speed up SOA of leverage 
by 20.4% whereas low overconfidence CEOs slow down SOA of leverage by 0.35%. In 
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untabulated results (available from the authors), we observe consistent but slightly stronger 
findings when book leverage is used as the dependent variable.  
The results in Table 2 are obtained following the methodology of prior studies that estimate 
target leverage and SOA of leverage in a two-step process. To confirm the robustness of our 
findings, we follow the approach of Jiang and Lie (2016) and Orlova and Rao (2018) which 
estimates target leverage and SOA of leverage simultaneously in one single step. The methodology 
of Jiang and Lie (2016) and Orlova and Rao (2018) is explained in Appendix B.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 reports results of SOA of leverage estimated using the methodology of Jiang and 
Lie (2016) and Orlova and Rao (2018). Without considering the effect of CEO confidence, SOA 
of leverage is 24.33% in Model (1). With CEO confidence taken into consideration, Model (2) 
shows that SOA of leverage is increase moderately to 25.25%. Comparing the results of Models 
(3), (4), and (5), it can be seen that SOA of leverage is increased (reduced) to 28.91% (22.71%) 
when firms have high- (low-) overconfidence CEOs. The results are similar and consistent with 
the findings reported in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2.2 SOA of cash  
Following the literature of adjustment speed of leverage (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; 
Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012; Devos et al., 2017), an examination of the relation between 
CEO confidence and cash adjustment speed is relatively straightforward and a partial adjustment 




𝜀𝑖𝑡   (6) 
The adjustment process of cash is similar to the adjustment of leverage. Assuming that a target 
level of cash exists (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009) and the objective of the firm is to 
maximize firm value, managers would want to maintain such an optimal cash level if doing so is 
costless. Firms with too much cash are likely to suffer significant agency problems. For example, 
excess cash enables entrenched managers to pursue unprofitable projects or even personal interests 
at the expense of the shareholders. On the contrary, a firm will be financially distressed if its 
inadequate cash holding disrupts the firm’s daily operations and requires the firm to seek external 
funds when unexpected contingencies arise. In both cases, the manager will choose to rebalance 
cash, which implies an active cash adjustment (i.e. γ1>0). However, in an imperfect capital market 
where adjustment costs are positive, firms may not fully adjust their cash holdings to the optimal 
level. Deviations from the target cash level may be adjusted partially as long as adjusting back to 
the target will bring about sufficiently large benefits that exceed the associated adjustment cost. In 
equation (6), we expect γ3 to be significantly different from zero if the association between CEO 
confidence and SOA of cash is significant.  
Table 4 reports regression results using equation (6). Without considering the effect of 
CEO confidence, the result of Model (1) shows that SOA of cash is 32.87%. That is, firms in the 
sample close 32.87% of the gap between target and actual cash within one year. In other words, 
an average firm takes 3.07 years to adjust deviations to the firm’s optimal cash level. With the 
effect of CEO confidence taken into consideration, the result of Model (2) shows that SOA of cash 
is increased to 38.62%. That is, the time of cash adjustment is reduced from 3.07 years to 2.59 
years. A comparison of the results of Models (3), (4), and (5) reveals that the decrease in the time 
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of cash adjustment is primarily driven by CEOs who are highly overconfident. When firms have 
highly overconfident CEOs, SOA of cash is 45.06%. When firms have low overconfidence CEOs, 
SOA of cash is 34.75%. That is, highly overconfident CEOs speed up SOA (reduce the adjustment 
time) of cash significantly whereas low overconfidence CEOs speed up SOA (reduce the 
adjustment time) of cash only marginally.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In Table 5, we report results of cash adjustment speed using the methodology of Jiang and 
Lie (2016) and Orlova and Rao (2018). The result in Table 5 are similar and consistent with the 
results in Table 4. That is, highly overconfident CEOs are associated with a significantly higher 
cash SOA whereas low overconfidence CEOs are associated with a marginally higher cash SOA. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.2.3 Positive and negative deviations from the target 
To garner supporting evidence for our hypotheses (H1 and H2), we examine the relation 
between CEO overconfidence and SOA of leverage (cash) by separating the sample into two, one 
for those with positive deviations (that is, the actual ratio is above target) and the other for those 
with negative deviations (the actual ratio is below target).  
In Panel A of Table 6, the result shows that when actual leverage is higher than target 
leverage (i.e., positive deviations), overconfident CEOs increase SOA of leverage from 21.35% 
(the full sample in Table 2 before CEO confidence is considered) to 33.87%. SOA of leverage is 
marginally reduced to 20.49% when the actual leverage is below target (i.e., negative deviations). 
The results imply that overconfident CEOs rapidly speed up (slightly slow down) adjusting 
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leverage back down (up) to the target when firm leverage is above (below) target leverage. The 
findings strongly suggest that overconfident CEOs do not want high firm leverage. The finding is 
consistent with view of Melmendier et al. (2011) that CEO overconfidence is associated with debt 
conservatism. However, the observation is also consistent with the view that overconfident CEOs 
are strong-willed individuals who distain being interfered by debtholders (Stotz and Nitzsch, 2005; 
Hiller and Hamrick, 2005; Miller and Ross, 1975).  
In panel B of Table 6, we focus our examination on the effect of highly overconfident 
CEOs only.  The result in Panel B shows that highly overconfident CEOs speed up SOA of 
leverage from 21.35% (the full sample in Table 2 without considering CEO overconfidence) to 
39.19% (27.96%) when the firm’s leverage is above (below) target.  The increase in SOA of 
leverage when deviations are positive is 44.6% higher than the increase in SOA of leverage when 
deviations are negative (coefficients of the interaction variable are 0.11428 and 0.07902, 
respectively). The finding implies a very strong tendency among highly overconfident CEOs to 
pare down firm debt.  
In Panel C of Table 6, we focus on the influence of low overconfidence CEOs only. The 
result in Panel C shows that low overconfidence CEOs speed up (slow down) SOA of leverage to 
29% (17.85%) when the firm’s leverage is above (below) target.  That is, low overconfidence 
CEOs also tend to keep firm leverage at a low level by making moderate adjustments. Given the 
fact that the CEOs have lower levels of overconfidence, thus it is reasonable to speculate that their 
tendency to avoid debt may be due to their conservativeness.  
Collectively, the results in Table 6 suggest that SOA of firm leverage is associated with the 
confidence of the CEO. Highly overconfident CEOs want to quickly reduce debt likely because 
19 
 
they resent the monitoring imposed by lenders and/or they consider debt unduly expensive, 
whereas low overconfidence CEOs want to keep debt at a low level below the target likely because 
the CEOs are conservative and/or unsure of their ability.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Next, we examine the association between CEO overconfidence and the adjustment speed 
of cash when there are positive (negative) deviations from the target. In Panel A of Table 7, the 
result shows that overconfident CEOs considerably slow down SOA of cash from 32.87% (the full 
sample in Table 4 before CEO confidence is considered) to 26.52% when the firm has positive 
cash deviations (that is, above the target cash holding).  The change represents lengthening the 
adjustment period from 3.04 years to 3.77 years. For firms with negative cash deviations, 
overconfident CEOs increase SOA considerably from 32.87% to 51.46% (that is, shorten the 
adjustment time from 3.07 years to 1.94 years). The results in Panel A clearly imply overconfident 
CEOs like to have high cash levels. In short, overconfident CEOs tend to keep cash at an excess 
level and very rapidly revise the firm’s cash holding upward if it is below the estimated target.  
In panel B of Table 7, we focus on the relation between SOA of cash and highly 
overconfident CEOs only.  The result in Panel B shows that highly overconfident CEOs slow down 
(speed up) SOA of cash from 32.87% (the full sample in Table 4 without considering CEO 
confidence) to 19.04% (61.20%) when the firm’s cash level is above (below) target.  These 
observations are consistent with the results reported in Panel A.  That is, highly overconfident 
CEOs tend to hoard cash.  
In Panel C of Table 7, we focus on the relation between SOA of cash and low 
overconfidence CEOs only. The result in Panel C shows that low overconfidence CEOs slow down 
(speed up) SOA of cash from 32.87% to 27.85% (44.02%) when the firm’s cash holding is above 
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(below) target.  The changes in the adjustment speed of cash, however, are considerably smaller 
when compared with highly overconfident CEOs. Collectively, the results of Table 7 highlight that 
CEO overconfidence has a large impact on the adjustment speed of cash holdings.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.3 Is cash negative debt? 
Up to this point, our results on SOAs of leverage and cash suggest that overconfident CEOs 
hoard cash and reduce leverage. While the findings are consistent with the argument of 
Malmendier et al. (2012) that overconfident CEOs prefer internal financing over external funds 
and that overconfident CEOs exhibit debt conservatism because they consider external financing 
too expensive, our results are also consistent with the view that cash and (negative) debt are 
substitutable (Kim et al., 1998; Baskin, 1987; John, 1993).   
The literature has provided significant evidence that corporate cash holding and firm 
leverage are related (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009), making it difficult to rule out that firms 
regard cash as negative debt. Kim et al. (1998) document that the optimal investment in liquidity 
is increasing in the cost of external financing.  Baskin (1987) argues that as the firm's debt ratio 
increases, the cost of funds used to invest in liquidity increases thereby reducing funded liquidity. 
John (1993) postulates that firms with access to debt markets—as proxied by the debt ratio—can 
use borrowing as a substitute for maintaining a stock of liquid assets.  
Acharya et al. (2007), however, argue that cash is not the same as negative debt. They 
argue that cash and negative debt perform different functions in the optimization of investment 
under uncertainty. According to Acharya et al., financially constrained firms prefer hoarding cash 
(rather than reducing debt) if investment opportunities tend to arrive in low cash flow states (that 
is, when hedging needs are high). Holding cash transfers resources from high cash flow states to 
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low cash flow states, permitting financially constrained firms to engage investment opportunities 
that arise in low cash flow states. In contrast, if hedging needs are low, constrained firms are better 
off reducing debt (save debt capacity) because it helps transfer resources into future states with 
high cash flows and allows the constrained firm to borrow more when investment needs arise.  
To confirm that our findings regarding the relation between CEO overconfidence and the 
respective adjustment speed of  leverage and cash are not confounded by cash-debt substitutability, 
we follow the methodology of Acharya et al. (2007) and explore how overconfident CEOs handle 
cash and leverage when the firm is financially constrained (unconstrained). Specifically, we first 
examine the cash flow sensitivity of cash and the cash flow sensitivity of debt of firms with 
overconfident (non-overconfident) CEOs without taking into consideration the hedging needs of 
the firm. Then we repeat the analysis by dividing the sample into firms with high (low) hedging 
needs. Following Acharya et al. (2007), the following 3SLS system equations are used: 
ΔDebti,t = a0 + a1CashFlowi,t + a2Qi,t + a3Sizei,t + a4ΔCashi,t + a5Debti,t + fixed effects + εi.t
 (7) 
ΔCashi,t = b0 + b1CashFlowi,t + b2Qi,t + b3Sizei,t + b4ΔDebti,t + b5Cashti,t + fixed effects + εi.t
 (8) 
In the model, ΔDebt is the ratio of the net long-term debt issuances to total assets, and  ΔCash is 
the ratio of change in cash and cash equivalent assets to total assets. a1 estimates the cash flow 
sensitivity of debt and b1 estimates the cash flow sensitivity of cash. The estimation controls for 
firm and year fixed effects.  If overconfident CEOs consider cash not the same as negative debt, 
we expect cash flow sensitivity of debt (a1) and cash flow sensitivity of cash (b1) to behave 
according to the arguments of Acharya et al (2007).  
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In Table 8, without considering the hedging needs of the firm, overconfident and non-
overconfident CEOs behave largely similarly in that they both hoard cash and reduce debt (increase 
debt capacity) to enable constrained firms to engage new investment opportunities. This finding is 
consistent with the view of Acharya et al. (2007) that firms hoard cash and reduce debt to engage 
investment opportunities that arise in the future.  Overconfident CEOs appear comparable to non-
overconfident CEOs in hoarding cash (0.1848*** vs 0.1628***) but are more aggressive in 
reducing firm leverage than non-overconfident CEOs (-0.2299*** vs -0.0894***). The finding 
suggests that overconfident CEOs either want to prepare for aggressive future investment plans or 
that they have a personal bias against firm leverage. For unconstrained firms, non-overconfident 
CEOs increase cash holdings (0.1124***) while simultaneously reduce leverage (-0.0665***) but 
overconfident CEOs do not make significant changes to cash or debt. The results on unconstrained 
firms imply that non-overconfident CEOs are conservative and cautious whereas overconfident 
CEOs are confident of their ability to engage investment opportunities such that they do not need 
to prepare for financing (reserve debt capacity) in advance.  In sum, the results in Table 8 suggest 
that CEOs manage liquidity and leverage of the firm to prepare for future investment opportunities.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
In Table 9, we report results using equations (7) and (8) with the firm’s hedging needs 
taken into consideration. Here, if the argument of Acharya et al. (2007) that cash is not negative 
debt is correct, we would expect to see the results for constrained firms with high hedging needs 
different from the results for constrained firms with low hedging needs. Specifically, according to 
Acharya et al., constrained firms should hoard cash (reduce debt) when hedging needs are high 
(low). For unconstrained firms, they are predicted to reduce debt.  
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In Panel A of Table 9, we measure hedging needs of a firm by the correlation between the 
firm’s cash flow and industry-median R&D expenditures (Acharya et al., 2007). A high (low) 
correlation implies low (high) hedging needs. The results in Panel A show that when hedging needs 
are high, constrained firms with non-overconfident CEOs increase cash holdings whereas 
constrained firms with overconfident CEOs increase cash holdings and reduce debt. Despite both 
types of CEOs increase cash as predicted by Acharya et al. (2007), the optimism (or 
overestimation) of overconfident CEOs regarding future investment needs is reflected by the 
significantly larger increases in cash holdings relative to non-overconfident CEOs (0.4159 vs 
0.2818). Reducing debt while hoarding cash at the same time suggest that overconfident CEOs are 
very optimistic about investment opportunities in the future that they want to also reserve debt 
capacity. Thus, while there is some evidence in Panel A supporting the argument of Acharya et al. 
(2007) that cash is not negative debt, the decision of overconfident CEOs to hoard cash and reduce 
debt appears to be also affected by the personality traits of the CEOs. That is, the inclination to 
reduce debt when the firm is constrained may imply that overconfident CEOs resent the monitoring 
imposed by lenders. When hedging needs are low, overconfident CEOs of constrained firms act as 
predicted by Acharya et al. (2007) in reducing debt, but non-overconfident CEOs do not reduce 
debt. Contrary to predictions, both overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs of constrained 
firms increase cash holdings when hedging needs are low. The cash hoarding by overconfident 
CEOs may imply their overestimation of investment needs in the future. The cash hoarding by 
non-overconfident CEOs may be an indication of their cautiousness, echoing the cash hoarding of 
non-overconfident CEOs when the firm is not financially constrained (reported in Table 8). Thus, 
the results on firms with low hedging needs also show some evidence supporting that cash is not 
negative debt, despite they also imply the influence of the personality traits of the CEOs.  
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In Panel B of Table 9, we measure hedging needs of a firm by the correlation between the 
firm’s cash flow and industry median 3-year-ahead sales growth (Acharya et al., 2007). A high 
(low) correlation implies low (high) hedging needs. The results of constrained firms with high 
hedging needs are largely consistent and similar to the results in Panel A. For firms with low 
hedging needs, only non-overconfident CEOs hoard cash, suggesting the cautiousness of the CEOs 
may be a factor related to the firm’s liquidity decisions. In short, Table 9 provides some evidence 
supporting that cash is not negative debt among overconfident CEOs, however, the results also 
imply that the personality traits of CEOs also play a role in the financial decisions of the firm. 
Taken together with the results on SOAs of leverage and cash, it is reasonable to say that the 
relation between CEO confidence and SOAs of leverage and cash do not imply a manifestation of 
the view that cash is negative debt. In addition, the results imply that the decision of overconfident 
CEOs to adjust SOA slower (faster) when actual cash (leverage) is above target represent choices 
that are also likely influenced by the personality traits of CEOs. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
4.3.1 SOA and financial constraints 
To incorporate the ‘cash is not negative debt’ argument of Acharya et al. (2007) in our 
investigation, we focus our attention on financially constrained firms because Acharya et al. 
predict constrained firms to act differently when facing high and low hedging needs. We divide 
our sample into subcategories according to CEO confidence, the firm’s hedging needs, and 
whether the deviation from target is positive or negative.  
In Panel A of Table 10, we report results on the relation between CEO overconfidence 
and the adjustment speed of cash of financially constrained firms that have high hedging needs 
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and negative deviations of cash. Based on the cash is not negative debt argument of Acharya et 
al. (2007), constrained firms are predicted to increase cash holdings instead of reducing debt if 
hedging needs are high. Comparing the results of Models (3), (4), and (5), it is observed that high 
overconfidence CEOs increase SOA of cash from 47.28% (2.12 years) to 65.29% (1.53 years). 
That is, highly overconfident CEOs of constrained firms that have high hedging needs and 
negative deviations of cash holdings adjust cash upward rapidly. Low overconfidence CEOs also 
increase SOA of cash but at a slower pace of 55.72%. The coefficient on CashDev*High 
overconfidence dummy is 0.2326 whereas the coefficient on CashDev*Low overconfidence 
dummy is 0.0952. That is, high overconfidence CEOs increase cash accumulations at a speed 
2.44 times that of low overconfidence CEOs. The finding implies that high overconfidence 
CEOs act in a way consistent with the prediction of Acharya et al. (2007). 
In Panel B of Table 10, we report results on the relation between CEO overconfidence 
and the adjustment speed of leverage of financially constrained firms that have high hedging 
needs and negative deviations of leverage.  In this case, constrained firms are predicted not to 
make significant changes to firm leverage if hedging needs are high. Comparing the results of 
Models (3), (4), and (5), it is observed that high- (low-) overconfidence CEOs slow down (speed 
up) adjusting firm leverage if it is below the estimated target. Highly overconfident CEOs slow 
down SOA of leverage from 29.97% (3.36 year) to 7.19% (13.91 years). The considerable slow 
down suggests that highly overconfident CEOs are keen on maintaining the firm’s leverage 
below target leverage. This is consistent with the view of Malmendier et al. (2011) that 
overconfident CEOs are associated with debt conservatism. On the other hand, Panel B shows 
that low overconfidence CEOs speed up SOA of leverage from 29.97% (3.36 years) to 43.17% 
(2.32 years). The result implies that low overconfidence CEOs want to increase leverage upward 
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towards the estimated target. Despite the results on SOA of leverage in Panel B are not 
consistent with the prediction of Acharya et al. (2007), the findings nevertheless show that 
reducing debt is frequently chosen by overconfident CEOs even when it is not predicted to 
happen. The results imply that debt conservatism, in addition to the expensive external financing 
argument of Malmendier at al. (2011), may be reflecting a behavior inherent in the personality 
trait of overconfident CEOs. Specifically, overconfident CEOs reduce firm leverage because 
they dislike the monitoring imposed by lenders.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Next, we examine constrained firms that have low hedging needs. In Panel A of Table 11, 
we report results on the relation between CEO overconfidence and the adjustment speed of cash 
of financially constrained firms that have low hedging needs and negative deviations of cash. In 
this case, constrained firms are predicted to reduce debt instead of increasing cash holdings. 
Comparing the results of Models (3), (4), and (5), it is observed that high overconfidence CEOs 
increase SOA of cash from 49.14% (2.04 years) to 91.43%% (1.09 years). That is, highly 
overconfident CEOs of constrained firms that have low hedging needs and negative deviations of 
cash holdings adjust cash upward rapidly. Low overconfidence CEOs, on the other hand, slow 
down SOA of cash from 49.14% (2.04 years) to 29.77% (3.36 years). The results are inconsistent 
with the prediction of Acharya et al. (2007) but they imply a very strong tendency among highly 
overconfident CEOs to accumulate cash. It is consistent with the findings reported earlier in this 
study and implies that overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability and hoard cash for 
investment opportunities in the future.  
In Panel B of Table 11, we report results on the relation between CEO overconfidence 
and the adjustment speed of leverage of financially constrained firms that have low hedging 
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needs and negative deviations of leverage.  Constrained firms are predicted to reduce leverage in 
this case. Comparing the results of Models (3), (4), and (5), it is observed that high 
overconfidence CEOs slow down SOA of leverage from 44.26% (2.26 years) to 14.21% (7.04 
years). The slow down implies highly overconfident CEOs want to keep firm leverage below 
target leverage. The observation is consistent with the prediction of Acharya et al. (2007). Low 
overconfidence CEOs, on the other hand, make a marginal increase in SOA of leverage from 
44.26% to 45.19%, implying that low overconfidence CEOs want to adjust firm leverage 
upward. 
Collectively, the results in Tables 10 and 11 provide support for the predictions of 
Acharya et al. (2007) that cash is not same as negative debt, but the results also point to the 
implication that the firm’s financial decisions are also influenced by the personality traits of 
CEOs,2 such as their dislike of being interfered. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
To make our investigation complete, we also examine financially unconstrained firms. 
For brevity sake, we only report the estimates of SOA of cash (leverage) in Table 12.  According 
to Acharya et al. (2007), unconstrained firms are expected to reduce leverage instead of 
increasing cash holding. In Panel A of Table 12, comparing the results of Model (3), (4), and (5), 
it can be seen that highly overconfident CEOs of unconstrained firms with high hedging needs 
speed up significantly (marginally) the adjustment speed of leverage (cash) if firm leverage 
(cash) has positive deviations. That is, highly overconfident CEOs prefer reducing debt to 
hoarding cash when the firm is unconstrained. The finding is consistent with the prediction of 
 
2 Untabulated results based on constrained firms with positive deviations of cash or leverage are weaker and less 
consistent. They are available upon request. 
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Acharya et al. (2007). The results on unconstrained firms with low hedging needs, however, are 
not supportive of the prediction of Acharya et al. In Panel B of Table 12, comparing the results 
of Model (3), (4), and (5), the results show that highly overconfident CEOs of unconstrained 
firms with low hedging needs and negative deviations of leverage slow down SOA of leverage to 
keep firm leverage at a level below target but increase SOA of cash to bring cash level upwards. 
In sum, the results on unconstrained firms provide some mixed evidence supporting the view that 
cash is not same as negative debt. Nevertheless, the results also suggest the cash and leverage 
adjustment decisions of firms that have overconfident CEOs are confounded by other aspects of 
CEO overconfidence in addition to the tendency to overestimate their ability and the inclination 
to underestimate risk in the face of uncertainty.   
[Insert Table 12] 
5. Summary and conclusion 
We investigate the relation between CEO overconfidence and the respective adjustment 
speed of firm leverage and cash. Unlike prior studies that focus on either the adjustment speed of 
leverage or cash, we argue that an investigation of the two together is important as the literature 
has significant evidence suggesting that firm leverage and cash holdings are related. Our results 
show that CEO overconfidence plays an important role in adjusting firm leverage and cash. 
Specifically, overconfident CEOs speed up (slow down) the adjustment of firm leverage when it 
is above (below) target leverage. In addition, overconfident CEOs speed up (slow down) the 
adjustment of firm cash holding when it is below (above) the estimated target. Our results remain 
robust upon using different methodologies to estimate adjustment speed. Our finding that 
overconfident CEOs hoard cash and reduce debt is consistent with the view of Malmendier et al. 
(2007) that overconfident CEOs prefer internal funds to eternal financing and the CEOs exhibit 
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debt conservatism. Despite our findings are also consistent with earlier studies that cash and 
negative debt are substitutable, our results do not represent a manifestation of the view that cash 
is same as negative debt. Consistent with the prediction of Acharya et al. (2007), our analysis 
suggests that cash and reduced leverage serve different purposes in the eyes of overconfident 
CEOs.  Specifically, we find evidence that overconfident CEOs of financially constrained firms 
that have high (low) hedging needs hoard cash (reduce debt). That is, cash and negative debt 
serve different purposes for firm investment activity in the face on uncertainty. Our additional 
finding that overconfident CEOs reduce debt in unwarranted situations (that is, when financially 
constrained firms have high hedging needs), however, suggests that other aspects of the 
personality traits of overconfident CEOs may also play a role in the adjustment of firm leverage 
and cash. That is, the debt conservatism associated with overconfident CEOs may also reflect 
their resentment of the monitoring imposed by lenders, a personality trait inherent to strong-
willed individuals who dislike being interfered.   
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics  
variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
ch_at 22,972 0.1061 0.1158 0.0234 0.0685 0.1478 
ch_nta 22,972 0.1477 0.2487 0.0239 0.0738 0.1739 
ch_sale 22,972 0.1626 0.6942 0.0217 0.0675 0.1649 
size 23,234 7.1625 1.5591 6.01778 7.0178 8.1989 
TobinQ 23,234 1.9778 1.2060 1.2235 1.5958 2.2781 
divdummy 23,234 0.5354 0.4988 0 1 1 
rated 23,234 0.8678 0.3387 1 1 1 
cashflow 21,831 0.0859 0.0958 0.0547 0.0878 0.1253 
nwcap 22,409 0.1218 0.1740 0.0078 0.1056 0.2197 
capex 23,093 0.0589 0.0570 0.0231 0.0427 0.0729 
booklev 17,511 0.2015 0.1844 0.0144 0.1823 0.3205 
rddummy 23,234 0.1228 0.3283 0 0 0 
LEV 23,232 0.1992 0.2048 0.0239 0.1458 0.2993 
MB 23,223 1.6687 1.2047 0.9102 1.3014 1.9928 
BDR 23,232 0.2125 0.1795 0.0422 0.2001 0.3231 
ebit_ta 21,832 0.0852 0.1130 0.0456 0.0930 0.1413 
dep_at 23,233 0.0455 0.0263 0.0278 0.0406 0.0560 
lnta 23,234 20.0859 1.5591 18.9413 19.9413 21.1225 









 Dependent variable  
LEVt+1 –LEVt 
Independent variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
LevDev 
0.2135 0.2059 0.2106 0.2118 0.2127 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LevDev*Overconfidence 
dummy 
  0.0215       
  (0.071)       
Overconfidence Dummy 
  0.0089       
  (<0.001)       
LevDev*High 
overconfidence dummy 
    0.0429     
    (0.045)     
High overconfidence 
Dummy 
    0.0110     
    (<0.001)     
LevDev*Medium 
overconfidence dummy 
      0.0168   
      (0.421)   
Medium overconfidence 
dummy 
      0.0062   
      (0.015)   
LevDev*Low 
overconfidence dummy 
        -0.0007 
        (0.965) 
Low overconfidence 
dummy 
       0.0046 
        (0.027) 
Intercept 0.0042 0.0011 0.0032 0.0035 0.0035 
32 
 
(<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Speed of Adjustment 21.35% 22.75% 25.35% 22.86% 21.20% 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,647 15,647 15,647 15,647 15,647 








 Dependent variable  
LEVt+1 –LEVt 
Independent variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
LevDev 
0.2433 0.2411 0.2408 0.2425 0.2448 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LevDev*Overconfidence 
dummy 
  0.0114       
  (<0.001)       





    (<0.001)     
LevDev*Medium 
overconfidence dummy 
      0.0144   
      (<0.001)   
LevDev*Low 
overconfidence dummy 
        -0.0177 
        (-0.911) 
Intercept 
0.0038 0.0036 0.0037 0.0037 0.0038 
(0.02) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Speed of Adjustment 24.33% 25.25% 28.91% 25.69% 22.71% 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,644 15,644 15,644 15,644 15,644 














 Dependent variable  
Cash/Assetst+1 –Cash/Assetst 
Independent variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
CashDev 
0.3287 0.2993 0.3129 0.3255 0.3258 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
CashDev*Overconfidence 
dummy 
  0.0869       
  (<0.001)       
Overconfidence dummy 
  -0.0079      
  (<0.001)       
CashDev*High 
overconfidence dummy 
    0.1376     
    (<0.001)     
High overconfidence 
dummy 
    -0.0089     
    (<0.001)     
CashDev*Medium 
overconfidence dummy 
      0.0371   
      (0.03)   
Medium overconfidence 
dummy 
      -0.0052   
      (<0.001)   
CashDev*Low 
overconfidence dummy 
        0.0217 
        (0.138) 
Low overconfidence 
dummy 
        -0.0047 
        (<0.001) 
Intercept 
0.0007 0.0031 0.0015 0.0012 0.0014 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
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Speed of Adjustment 32.87% 38.62% 45.06% 36.26% 34.75% 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,701 18,701 18,701 18,701 18,701 









 Dependent variable  
Cash/Assetst+1 –Cash/Assetst 
Independent variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
CashDev 
0.3287 0.2999 0.3131 0.3255 0.3259 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
CashDev*Overconfidence 
dummy 
  0.0872       
  (<0.001)       





    (<0.001)     
CashDev*Medium 
overconfidence dummy 
      0.0353   
      (-0.035)   
CashDev*Low 
overconfidence dummy 
        0.0216 
        (-0.21) 
Intercept 
0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Speed of Adjustment 32.87% 38.71% 45.72% 36.08% 34.75% 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,701 18,701 18,701 18,701 18,701 














Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 
Dependent variable  
 
Dependent variable  
 
Dependent variable  



















LevDev 0.2652 0.1970 LevDev 0.2777 0.2005 LevDev 0.2873 0.2051 




0.0734 0.0078 LevDev*High 
overconf. 
dummy 




(0.003) (0.805) (0.007) (0.184) (0.936) (0.561) 
Overconf. 
dummy 
0.0026 0.0113 High 
overconf. 
dummy 




(0.373) (0.01) (0.92) (0.009) (0.223) (0.6) 
Intercept -0.0055 0.0004 Intercept -0.0043 0.0028 Intercept -0.0051 0.0038 
(<0.001) (0.853) (0.003) (0.156) (0.004) (0.067) 
Speed of 
Adjustment 
33.87% 20.49% Speed of 
Adjustment 





Yes Yes Year Fixed 
Effect 





Yes Yes Industry 
Fixed Effect 





Observations 9,399 6,248 Observations 9,399 6,248 Observations 9,399 6,248 
























Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 
Dependent variable  
 
Dependent variable  
 


























CashDev 0.2235 0.3806 CashDev 0.2388 0.4003 CashDev 0.2282 0.4278 













(0.1) (<0.001) (0.268) (<0.001) (0.16) (0.678) 
Overconf. 
dummy 
-0.0064 0.0005 High 
overconf. 
dummy 




(0.001) (0.871) (0.875) (0.204) (0.008) (0.235) 
Intercept 0.0057 0.0134 Intercept 0.0038 0.0128 Intercept 0.0048 0.0147 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Speed of 
Adjustment 
26.52% 51.46% Speed of 
Adjustment 







Yes Yes Year Fixed 
Effect 





Yes Yes Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes 
Observations 11,305 7,414 Observations 11,305 7,414 Observations 11,305 7,414 








 Non-overconfident CEOs Overconfident CEOs 
1. Cashflow sensitivity of cash   
Constrained firms 0.1628*** 0.1848*** 
Unconstrained firms 0.1124*** -0.1640 
   
2. Cashflow sensitivity of debt   
Constrained firms -0.0894*** -0.2299*** 





Table 9a. Hedging needs measured by the correlation between cash flow and R&D expenditures 












sensitivity of cash 
    
Constrained 
firms 
0.2818*** 0.4159** 0.1299** 0.2371*** 
Unconstrained 
firms 
0.0367 -0.1292 0.1752** -0.0514 




    
Constrained 
firms 
-0.0164 -0.2659*** -0.0377 -0.2654** 
Unconstrained 
firms 





Table 9b. Hedging needs measured by the correlation between cash flow and sales growth 












sensitivity of cash 
    
Constrained 
firms 
0.1911*** 0.3393*** 0.1119*** 0.04776 
Unconstrained 
firms 
0.0960*** -0.0050 0.1221 -0.0624 




    
Constrained 
firms 
-0.1221 -0.4263*** -0.0464 -0.0959 
Unconstrained 
firms 








Table 10 Panel A.  Financially constrained firms with high hedging needs and negative deviations of cash 
 Dependent variable  
Cash/Assetst+1 –Cash/Assetst 
Independent variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
CashDev 
0.4728 0.4169 0.42028 0.4939 0.4619 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
CashDev*Overconfidence 
dummy 
  0.1254       
  (0.199)       
Overconfidence dummy 
  0.0032      
  (0.864)       
CashDev*High 
overconfidence dummy 
    0.2326     
    (0.054)     
High overconfidence 
dummy 
    0.0187     
    (0.475)     
CashDev*Medium 
overconfidence dummy 
      -0.2541   
      (0.148)   
Medium overconfidence 
dummy 
      -0.0252   
      (0.449)   
CashDev*Low 
overconfidence dummy 
        0.0953 
        (0.509) 
Low overconfidence 
dummy 
        -0.0018 
        (0.943) 
Intercept 
0.0206 0.0188 0.0164 0.0226 0.0213 
(0.022) (0.097) (0.089) (0.016) (0.03) 
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Speed of Adjustment 47.28% 54.22% 65.29% 23.98% 55.72% 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 356 356 356 356 356 
R-squared 0.2151 0.2219 0.2262 0.2204 0.2177 
 
 
Table 10  




Independent variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
LevDev 
0.2997 0.3043 0.3027 0.3051 0.2959 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LevDev*Overconfidence 
dummy 
  -0.0511       
  (0.765)       
Overconfidence Dummy 
  -0.0042       
  (0.846)       





    (0.478)     
High overconfidence Dummy 
    -0.0099     
    (0.725)     
LevDev*Medium 
overconfidence dummy 
      -0.4792   
      (0.251)   
Medium overconfidence 
dummy 
      -0.0302   
      (0.452)   
LevDev*Low overconfidence 
dummy 
        0.1358 
        (0.551) 
Low overconfidence dummy 
       0.0057 
        (0.854) 
Intercept 
0.0073 0.0080 0.0071 0.0077 0.0077 
(0.462) (0.548) (0.523) (0.461) (0.471) 
Speed of Adjustment 29.97% 25.32% 7.19% -17.41% 43.17% 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 









Table 11 Panel A. Financially constrained firms with low hedging needs and negative deviations of cash 
 Dependent variable  
Cash/Assetst+1 –Cash/Assetst 
Independent variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
CashDev 
0.4914 0.5004 0.4620 0.4909 0.5337 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
CashDev*Overconfidence 
dummy 
  -0.0286       
  (0.814)       
Overconfidence dummy 
  -0.0444      
  (0.021)       
CashDev*High 
overconfidence dummy 
    0.4523     
    (0.053)     
High overconfidence 
dummy 
    0.0271     
    (0.431)     
CashDev*Medium 
overconfidence dummy 
      0.2297   
      (0.411)   





      (0.288)   
CashDev*Low 
overconfidence dummy 
        -0.2361 
        (0.099) 
Low overconfidence 
dummy 
        -0.0566 
        (0.024) 
Intercept 
0.0248 0.0374 0.0238 0.0279 0.0331 
(0.005) (<0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
Speed of Adjustment 49.14% 47.18% 91.43% 72.06% 29.77% 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 




Table 11 Panel B. Financially constrained firms with low hedging needs and negative deviations of leverage 
 
Dependent variable  
LEVt+1 –LEVt 
Independent variable Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
LevDev 0.4426 0.4679 0.4534 0.4521 0.4432 
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(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LevDev*Overconfidence 
dummy 
  -0.2094       
  (0.277)       
Overconfidence Dummy 
  -0.0346       
  (0.209)       
LevDev*High overconfidence 
dummy 
    -0.3113     
    (0.406)     
High overconfidence Dummy 
    -0.0516     
    (0.266)     
LevDev*Medium 
overconfidence dummy 
      -0.3218   
      (0.303)   
Medium overconfidence 
dummy 
      -0.0426   
      (0.375)   
LevDev*Low overconfidence 
dummy 
        0.0087 
        (0.977) 
Low overconfidence dummy 
       -0.0015 
        (0.97) 
Intercept 
0.0329 0.0409 0.0366 0.0349 0.0333 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
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Speed of Adjustment 44.26% 25.85% 14.21% 13.02% 45.19% 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 








Table 12. Panel A. Financially unconstrained firms with positive deviations of leverage (cash) 





Leverage  26.33% 51.00% 89.76% 56.02% 38.13% 
 SOA Cash 36.83% 32.97% 45.38% 39.93% 20.58% 





Leverage 26.13% 27.29% 10.17% 35.54% 27.99% 
 SOA Cash 6.17% 18.51% -39.68% 12.41% 45.43% 
 




SOA Leverage  
6.51% 31.08% 80.03% -11.15% 
 SOA Cash 36.23% 54.02% 59.37% 53.16% 




23.57% 21.85% -15.74% 42.10% 
 SOA Cash 34.07% 30.74% 61.29% 36.44% 
 
 
Appendix 1.A: Variable definitions 
Ch_at: Cash scale by book value of total assets.  
Ch_nta: cash scale by net total assets.  
Ch_sale: cash scale by sales.  
Size: natural log of book value of assets.  




Divdummy: Dividend dummy set to 1 if the company pays dividend otherwise zero.  
Rated: rated dummy set to 1 if the company has public debt otherwise 0.  
Cashflow: calculated as: EBITDA-interest-taxes- common dividends, and then scale by total 
assets.  
Nwcap: net working capital is net working capital minus cash and marketable securities and 
then scale by  
total assets.  
Capex: capital expenditures scaled by total assets.  
Booklev: total debt scale by total assets.  
LEV: market debt ratio calculated by book value of debt/market value of asset.  
BDR: book debt ratio: long-term debt+ short term debt and then scale by total assets.  
MB: market to book ratio of assets: (book liabilities + market value of equity)/total assets.  
Rddummy: R&D dummy set to one if firm did not report R&D expenses.  
rdta: R&D expense scale by total assets.  
Lnta: log of asset size, measured in 1983 dollars.  
Dep-at: depreciation (Compustat item [14]) as a proportion of total assets 
Overceo: overconfident CEO dummy set to one if CEO consider as overconfident.  
Delaware: Delaware dummy set to one is the firm incorporated in Delaware otherwise 0.  
After95: after 95 dummy set to one for firm years after 1995, and zero otherwise.  
BCL: BCL dummy set to one if firm incorporated in a stat and in a year that business 





Measuring SOA of firm leverage (cash) following the method of Jiang and Lie (2016) and 
Orlova and Rao (2018) 
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Jiang and Lie (2016) and Orlova and Rao (2018) use a different approach to estimate SOA 
in which the target cash (or leverage) and the partial adjustment process are estimated 
simultaneously. Using SOA of leverage for illustration, the following equation (equation 
(1)) is used to estimate the speed at which a firm makes partial adjustments towards its 
target within each period. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣i,t+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣i,t =  λ (Lev*i,t+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣i,t)+𝜀i,t+1 (1) 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡+1 represents a firm’s book leverage ratio at time t+1, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 represents the firm’s 
book leverage ratio at time t, (Lev*𝑡+1−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡) represents the deviation from target leverage, 
and λ is the average annual leverage adjustment speed to the target. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣*i,t+1=𝛽𝑋i,t+𝜀i,t     (2)  
where Lev* is the estimated target leverage ratio of the firm, X is a vector of firm and 
industry characteristics that are included in the regressions to estimate the target. The firm 
characteristics include profitability (EBIT/TA), growth opportunities (MB), nondebt tax 
shield (Dep/TA), firm size (LnTA), asset tangibility (FA/TA), and research and 
development expenditures (R&D/TA). In addition, industry median leverage is added as 
another Independent variable following the literature (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) .  
Substituting (2) into (1) and rearranging the terms yields: 
Levi,t+1= (λβ) Хi,t+ (1- λ )Levi,t+ δi, t+1                               (3) 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝐿𝑒𝑣̂ i, t+1= 𝐿𝑒?̂?*i,t+1 - Levi,t                                                (4) 
 
Substituting equation (4) into equation (1) leads to an OLS regression model: 
 






λ i,t+1 = γ0 + γi,t+1Ζi,t                                                                (6) 
Substituting (6) into (5) leads to  
Levi,t+1- Levi,t = (γ0 + γi,t+1Ζi,t )(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝐿𝑒𝑣̂ i, t+1)+ δi, t+1              (7) 
where Z represents the variables that we hypothesize to have an impact on the adjustment 
speed of leverage. Following Oztekin and Flannery (2012), equation (7) is estimated 
using OLS regression. The model controls for firm and year fixed effects in the 
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CHAPTER 2  





A strong relation between agency conflicts and top management incentives has been 
reported in the literature. Two well-known management incentives include equity-based 
compensation and debt-based compensation. Two well-recognized agency conflicts 
within the firm are the conflict between shareholders and the manager and the conflict 
between debtholders and the manager. The literature on agency conflicts is voluminous. 
While the early literature has concluded that equity-based compensation aligns the 
interests of managers and shareholders and thus mitigates the agency conflict between 
them, recent research finds that inside debt helps align the interests of managers and 
debtholders and thus alleviates the agency conflict between them. More recently, a 
growing body of literature is investigating the optimal chief executive officer (CEO) 
incentive ratio for mitigating the two types of agency conflicts at the same time. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were among the first to state that inside equity compensation 
and inside debt compensation used together can alleviate shareholder–bondholder 
conflicts. They propose a straightforward general rule to solve agency problems, 
specifically that the firm should grant a manager inside debt and equity incentives so that 
the manager’s ratio is similar to the firm’s leverage ratio. In this situation, the manager 
will consider the interests of both shareholders and debtholders appropriately. If the 
manager’s debt-to-equity ratio is below the firm’s, then the manager has incentive to 
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benefit personally by promoting the interests of shareholders at the expense of 
debtholders. 
Edmans and Liu (2011) develop a more complicated model regarding the optimal 
compensation contract for managers facing effort and investment choices. The authors 
point out that the CEO’s optimal debt-to-equity ratio (inside debt divided by inside 
equity) can be greater or less than the firm’s because of several factors. These factors 
include the relative importance of risk shifting, the firm value in solvency, and the firm 
value in bankruptcy. According to Edmans and Liu, the CEO’s optimal inside debt-to-
equity ratio is not necessarily equal to one. Freund, Latif, and Phan (2018) confirm this 
finding and state that the optimal inside debt ratio differs across firms. 
Several recent studies have documented a negative relation between management inside 
debt holdings and firm risk taking behavior (Edmans and Liu, 2011; Phan, 2014; Bennett 
et al., 2015; Van Bekkum, 2016), because inside debt is an unsecured and unfunded form 
of firm debt and it aligns a firm’s managers to the firm’s debtholders. Thus CEOs holding 
inside debt are exposed to company default risk and have incentives to lower firm risk 
taking activity. Although extensive research has been carried out to find the optimal 
inside debt ratio, no study has examined the association between deviations from the 
optimal inside debt ratio and the firm’s risk taking behavior. We intend to fill this void in 
this study. 
We start our investigation by estimating the optimal CEO inside debt-to-equity ratio. By 
following the work of Campbell et al. (2016), we use firm and CEO characteristics to 
estimate the optimal CEO inside debt ratio. We then calculate the difference between the 
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actual and optimal inside debt levels. Next, we investigate the association between 
deviations from optimal inside debt and the firm’s risk taking behavior. 
In addition, a growing literature suggests that firm behavior is affected by CEO 
overconfidence. We expand our investigation to examine the effect of CEO 
overconfidence and CEO inside debt on firm risk taking behavior. 
Our investigation makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study 
complements and extends the literature that investigates the effects of management 
incentives on corporate risk taking behavior. Our results show that firms change their risk 
taking behavior when inside debt deviates from the optimal level. Specifically, we find 
that the CEO will increase firm risk taking activities when the CEO’s inside debt is below 
the optimal level (negative deviation). This finding is consistent with the results of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011), who argue that CEOs with high inside 
debt display lower levels of risk taking. By using different proxies to measure firm risk 
taking behavior—namely, capital expenditures, research and development (R&D), and 
cash levels—we find consistent results, where a negative deviation of inside debt 
escalates the risk taking behavior of firms with overconfident CEOs. Our results also 
show that the firm’s risk taking activity is moderated when the CEO’s inside debt is 
above the target level. Our results are more pronounced when the CEO is categorized as 
overconfident. 
Second, our study provides an important contribution to an emerging stream of empirical 
research by examining the association between CEO overconfidence and CEO inside 
debt. We find that, relative to rational CEOs, overconfident CEOs tend to be associated 
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with larger deviations from the optimal level of inside debt. Specifically, overconfident 
CEOs tend to hold less inside debt compared to rational CEOs. 
Third, our investigation is the first paper to examine the effects of deviations of inside 
debt and CEO overconfidence on firm value. We find a positive relation between firm 
value and deviations from the target level of inside debt. More importantly, we find that 
overconfident CEOs will increase firm value when their inside debt is above the target 
level. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample, the measurement of 
the major variables, and the empirical design. Section 5 reports the result of our primary 
tests and robustness checks, and the final section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 CEO inside debt and the optimal level of inside debt  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of ownership and control 
causes managers to deviate from protecting shareholder interests to maximize their 
personal benefits. This situation leads to the first type of agency conflict: conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest firms add stock 
and stock options to a manager’s compensation package to remedy this type of conflict. 
They argue that equity-based compensation will align the manager’s and shareholders’ 
interests. Despite equity- and option-based compensations driving managers to adopt 
corporate policies that protect shareholder interests, policies that benefit shareholders are 
frequently disadvantageous to debtholders. This situation thus leads to the second type of 
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agency conflict: conflicts between managers and debtholders. To remedy the second of 
agency conflict, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest firms add debt-based compensation 
to align the manager’s and debtholders’ interests. This mention is the first time that CEO 
inside debt appears in the corporate finance literature. 
In short, to alleviate conflicts among managers, shareholders, and debtholders, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) propose that the firm grant the manager inside debt and equity 
incentives simultaneously so that the manager’s debt-to-equity ratio is the same as the 
firm’s. John and John (1993) state that an optimal compensation package should be 
designed to eliminate both types of agency conflict. 
Edmans and Liu (2011) argue that the CEO’s optimal compensation ratio is not 
necessarily equal to the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. Specifically, to measure the incentive 
compensation package of managers, they introduce a ratio called the CEO relative 
leverage ratio, where the CEO’s relative leverage is equal to his or her debt-to-equity 
ratio divided by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. The authors predict that the optimal CEO 
relative leverage ratio varies with firm characteristics. Thus, this ratio is not always equal 
to one, as Jensen and Meckling propose. Consistent with the view of Edmans of Liu 
(2011), Freund, Latif, and Phan (2018) find similar results and argue that the optimal 
inside debt ratio differs across firms. 
One of the potential limitations of the CEO relative leverage ratio, however, is that it is 
based on levels rather than changes in the value of debt and equity. As Wei and Yermack 
(2011) state,  
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In a simple capital structure with only plain vanilla debt and equity, this 
distinction should be unimportant. However, managers tend to hold much 
of their equity in stock options that have finite expirations and convex 
slopes with respect to firm value, while much of the firm’s equity takes the 
form of shares that have unlimited lives and linear slopes with respect to 
firm value. Moreover, the manager’s inside debt may have a different 
duration than the debt securities issued externally by the firm. 
Hence, Wei and Yermack introduce a new ratio called the CEO relative incentive ratio. 
This ratio estimates how a $1 increase in firm value affects the value of the CEO’s inside 
debt compared to inside equity claims, divided by an estimate of how the value of the 
company’s external debt versus external equity is affected by the same $1 change in firm 
value. The authors use the sum of the CEO’s pension value and the total value of deferred 
compensation as the CEO’s debt incentive. They measure CEO equity incentive as the 
delta of the CEO’s shares of stock plus the delta of the CEO’s option holdings. 
Compared to Edmans and Liu (2011), Wei and Yermack (2011) include not only firm 
characteristics but also CEO characteristics to estimate the optimal inside debt-to-equity 
ratio. They suggest that their optimal relative incentive ratio explains better than the 
relative leverage ratio. 
2.2 CEO inside debt and corporate risk taking 
Diversified shareholders benefit from higher levels of firm risk, because shareholders 
receive large payoffs when risky investments perform well and bear only limited losses 
when these fail. Therefore, the addition of option-based compensation to managerial 
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compensation will encourage managers to increase firm risk. A considerable amount of 
literature has found that option-based compensation provides incentives to managers to 
increase corporate risk taking by changing the company’s investment and financial 
policies (Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Nam et al., 2003; Coles et al., 2006; 
Low, 2009; Sheikh, 2012). 
On the other hand, debtholders receive only a fixed amount of payments when the firm 
succeeds in a risky project. If this risky project fails, debtholders will suffer substantial 
financial losses. Debtholders thus prefer conservative investment policies and lower 
levels of corporate risk, as well as conservative financial policies and lower levels of 
corporate debt. Because pension and deferred compensation (CEO inside debt) share the 
same characteristics with external debt, the value of the CEO’s inside debt depends on 
the firm’s likelihood of bankruptcy and the liquidation value of its assets (Edmans and 
Liu, 2011). It is well established in the literature that these characteristics of CEO inside 
debt motivate CEOs to reduce firm risk. Thus, inside debt aligns CEO interests with the 
interests of outside debtholders and leads to conservative investment and financial 
policies. 
Jensen and Meckling introduced agency problems back in 1976. After that, researchers 
have extensively investigated inside equity and its implications. Because data on CEO 
inside debt became available only after 2006, few studies have examined the effect of 
CEO inside debt.  
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) are among the earliest to have examined CEO inside 
debt. They employ CEO pension benefits to measure inside debt because of the lack of 
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deferred compensation data. Their results show that CEO inside debt holdings are 
negatively related to the firm’s default risk, which induces CEOs to manage their firms 
conservatively. Similarly, Cheng and Warfield (2005) state that inside equity imposes 
firm risk on the CEO; therefore, inside debt creates personally risk-averse CEOs. Gerakos 
(2007) finds inside debt to be positively related to the firm’s credit rating and negatively 
related to default risk. Wei and Yermack (2011) indicate that the disclosure of sizable 
inside debt positions will lead to an escalation in bond price and a reduction in equity 
volatility. They suggest that inside debt indicates a reduction in corporate risk. 
Cassell et al. (2012) directly examine the effect of CEO inside debt on firm risk. They 
find a negative relation between CEO inside debt and the volatility of future stock 
returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage. They also find a positive relation 
between CEO inside debt and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. For some 
industries, such as the insurance industry, Milldonis et al. (2019) find a negative relation 
between CEO inside debt and risk taking behavior. Phan (2014) indicates that, when 
CEOs have high levels of inside debt, they undertake mergers and acquisitions that will 
benefit bondholders, but at the cost of stockholders. Srivastav et al. (2018) find similar 
results. They examine the influence of inside debt on bank risk taking behaviors and find 
that CEOs with high inside debt like to engage in acquisitions that transfer wealth from 
stockholders to bondholders. 
Collectively, the above research provides evidence that CEO inside debt negatively 
affects corporate risk taking. However, no study investigates the relation between CEO 
inside debt and corporate risk taking when the CEO’s inside debt deviates from the 
optimal level. This study is the first to fill this void in the literature. 
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2.3 CEO overconfidence 
One common observation in the psychology literature is that people tend to be 
overconfident (e.g., Kidd, 1970; Moore, 1977). Financial economists find that CEOs are 
no exception to this rule (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Ben-David et al., 2013). 
Overconfidence is defined as the overestimation of one’s own abilities (Danial et al., 
1998). Overconfident CEOs believe they have a better understanding of situations (Hiller 
and Hambrick, 2005) and that they are “miracle workers” (Tang, Li, and Yang, 2012). 
Behavioral literature has evidence that overconfident persons enjoy control (Stotz and 
Nitzsch, 2005). Overconfident individuals tend to have enormous pride, and there is a 
substantial literature highlighting the egos of business executives (Roll, 1986; Hiller and 
Hamrick, 2005). In addition, overconfident individuals have been found to be prone to a 
self-importance bias, and they tend to disregard the opinions of others (Miller and Ross, 
1975). Collectively, the above suggests that overconfident CEOs are strong-willed 
individuals who dislike interference. 
Studies over the past two decades have provided valuable information on CEO 
overconfidence and corporate risk. Odean (1998) finds that CEO overconfidence leads to 
excess firm risk and unexpected consequences. Studies have also found that 
overconfident CEOs are less conservative and more optimistic than rational CEOs 
(Campbell et al., 2011; Gervais et al., 2011). Therefore, overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to match diversified shareholders’ risk preferences and tend to invest in risky 
projects (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Gervais et al., 2011). Furthermore, Goel and Thakor 
(2008) argue that overconfident CEOs can increase firm value by reducing the 
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underinvestment problem associated with risk-averse CEOs. Several authors have found 
that overconfident CEOs are associated with inferior investment, leverage, and share 
repurchase decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Yung et al., 2015). 
Overconfident CEOs are more likely to overinvest in risky projects when the firm has 
plenty of internal funds (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
3. Hypothesis development 
As mentioned in previous sections, there is evidence that CEO inside equity provides 
incentives for managers to increase corporate risk taking (Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002; Nam et al., 2003; Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Sheikh, 2012). In 
contrast, there is also empirical evidence showing a negative relation between CEO 
inside debt and corporate risk taking (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Edmans and Liu, 
2011; Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassel et al., 2012). When the actual CEO inside debt 
level is above the optimum, CEOs face greater risk exposure to the firm’s leverage. Thus, 
we argue that positive deviations from the optimal inside debt level will be negatively 
related to firm risk taking. Vice versa, when there is a negative deviation from the 
optimal inside debt level, CEOs can improve their personal benefits by aligning with 
shareholder interests. Thus, we argue that negative deviations from the optimal level of 
inside debt is positively related to firm risk taking. 
The behavioral finance literature has long established that hubris affects managerial risk 
attitudes (Roll, 1986; Heaton, 2002). Overconfident CEOs systematically overestimate 
their ability to process risk, causing them to engage in corporate risk taking activity. 
Compared to rational CEOs, who perceive firm risk correctly, overconfident CEOs tend 
to be more aggressive in taking on risky projects (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Hirshleifer 
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et al., 2012). In addition, Malmendier et al. (2005, 2008) show that overconfident CEOs 
exhibit below-average levels of risk aversion by holding inside equity beyond rational 
thresholds. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that overconfident CEOs invest heavily in R&D, 
which leads to a higher level of innovation, but also a higher level of uncertainty. 
How CEO overconfidence interacts with CEO inside debt to affect firm risk taking 
behavior is not yet known in the literature. Our study is the first to investigate the 
association between both CEO inside debt and CEO overconfidence and corporate risk 
taking at the same time. 
We argue that the risk taking incentive of CEO overconfidence is mitigated when CEOs’ 
inside debt levels are above the optimum (positive inside debt deviation), and elevated 
when CEOs’ inside debt levels are below the optimum (negative inside debt deviation). 
This leads to the following hypotheses. 
H1: Positive deviations of inside debt (i.e., actual debt greater than optimal) 
mitigate the risk taking activities of firms with overconfident CEOs 
H2: Negative deviations of inside debt (i.e., actual debt less than optimal) 
escalate the risk taking activities of firms with overconfident CEOs. 
Previous research findings on the effects of CEO overconfidence on firm value are 
inconsistent. One line of academic research investigates the positive effect of CEO 
overconfidence on firm performance. Shipman and Mumford (2011) argue that 
overconfident CEOs are charismatic leaders who can enhance firm value. In addition, 
CEO overconfidence has been suggested to potentially increase firm value by reducing 
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the underinvestment problem (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Campbell et al., 2011; Gervais et 
al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Another positive effect related to CEO overconfidence 
is innovation. Galasso and Simcoe (2011) find CEO overconfidence to have a positive 
effect on firm innovation and point out that this positive effect is more pronounced in 
competitive industries and when the firm is less financially constrained. 
On the other hand, there is also significant evidence that CEO overconfidence has a 
negative effect on firm value. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate their ability and 
invest in value-destroying projects (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Deshmukh et al., 2013).  
CEOs with high levels of inside debt are found to be associated with conservative 
corporate policies. Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014) show that CEOs with higher inside debt 
holdings are more risk averse and hold more cash. Therefore, high levels of inside debt 
could lead to underinvestment. Wei and Yermack (2011) find that greater inside debt 
reduces risk, transfers value from equity to debt, and destroys overall firm value. He 
(2015) finds that CEOs with higher inside debt levels adopt more conservative 
accounting policies to prevent risky and value-destroying investments. We argue that 
overconfident CEOs mitigate risk aversion when CEO inside debt is above optimal and 
are thus associated with a positive impact on firm value. On the other hand, CEOs with 
inside debt below the optimal tend to increase firm risk and destroy firm value. We argue 
that CEO overconfidence exacerbates decreases in firm value. 




H3: Positive (negative) deviations of inside debt are associated with increases 
(decreases) in the value of firms with overconfident CEOs. 
4. Key variables, measurement, and empirical methodology 
4.1 Measuring CEO overconfidence 
The literature identifies overconfident CEOs as those who deliberately overexpose their 
personal wealth to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms (Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 
1991; Hall and Murphy, 2002). We follow Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and define 
a CEO as overconfident once the CEO postpones exercising vested options that are at 
least 67% in the money. The 67% threshold is based on a calculation by Hall and Murphy 
(2002), who suggest that failure to exercise an option that is 67% in the money implies a 
constant relative risk aversion value of three. Given no detailed information on CEO 
options holdings and the exercise price of each granted option, we follow prior studies 
(Campbell et al., 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2012) in calculating the average moneyness of 
the CEO’s option portfolio for each year. First, for each CEO–year, the average realizable 
value per option is calculated by dividing the total realizable value of the options by the 
number of options the CEO holds. The strike price is calculated as the fiscal year-end 
stock price minus the average realizable value. The average option moneyness is equal to 
the stock price divided by the estimated strike price minus one. In these computations, 
only the vested options are included. CEO overconfidence is represented by a dummy 
variable that has a value of one if the CEO is identified as overconfident, and zero 
otherwise. Similar to the argument of Hirshleifer et al. (2012), the overconfidence 
measure of a CEO remains unchanged over the sample period because personality traits 
are considered persistent. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) show that this measure of 
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overconfidence works well after controlling for past stock return performance. In 
addition, Campbell et al. (2011) show that this measure of overconfidence generates 
results similar to those of Malmendier and Tate (2005). 
4.2 Measuring CEO inside debt 
In this study, we employ several common measures of CEO inside debt following the 
literature. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) define CEO leverage as the ratio of the CEO’s 
inside debt to the CEO’s inside equity. The CEO’s inside debt is the sum of the present 
value of accumulated pension benefits and deferred compensation, and the CEO’s inside 
equity is the sum of the value of the CEO’s stock and option holdings. The value of stock 
is calculated as the number of common stock and preferred stock held by the CEO, 
multiplied by the fiscal year-end stock price. We use the Black–Scholes (1973) option 
pricing model (Merton, 1973; Core and Guay, 2002) to calculate option value. The details 
of the calculation of option value are given in the Appendix. We define the CEO relative 
leverage ratio (Edmans and Liu, 2011; Cassell et al., 2012; Phan, 2014) as the ratio of the 
CEO’s leverage divided by the firm’s leverage. Following Edmans and Liu (2011), we 











If k = 1, the CEO should have no incentive to engage in plans that transfer wealth from 
debtholders to stockholders or vice versa. 
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As mentioned by Wei and Yermack (2011), one limitation of the ratio k is that it does not 
capture changes in the values of debt and equity. Therefore, we follow Wei and Yermack 












Following Wei and Yermack, we assume ∆DCEO/∆DFirm = DCEO/DFirm. Thus, we use the 











The calculations of the terms ∆ECEO and ∆EFirm are explained in detail in the Appendix. 
4.3 Measuring the target CEO inside debt level 
We draw upon the framework of Campbell et al. (2016) to estimate the target/optimal 
relative CEO leverage ratio (k) and relative CEO incentive ratio (k*). The regression 
model we use in this study to predict the optimal contracting-based target ratio is 
ln(𝑘 or 𝑘∗) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛾3 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
+ 𝛾4 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛾5 𝑅&𝐷/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾6 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑃&𝐸/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛾7 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛾8 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾9 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝜀 
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We estimate the first-stage regression model using all available data, and we use the 
fitted values from this regression as our target ratios. After computing the target ratios for 
both k and k*, we calculate the difference between the actual and optimal inside debt 
ratios to obtain the deviation variables. 
4.4 Measuring firm risk taking behavior 
Following previous studies, we measure firm risk taking behavior by capital expenditures 
(CAPEX/TA) and R&D expenses (R&D/TA), respectively. In addition, we use the 
leverage and cash levels as the dependent variable to measure firm risk taking behavior, 
as a robustness check. 
4.5 Empirical methodology 
Following previous studies (Cassell et al., 2012), we use the following model to estimate 
the effects of deviation from optimal inside debt on firm risk taking behavior: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 
where DISD is the deviation from the optimal inside debt. We used the actual k (k*) ratio 
minus the optimal k (k*) ratio to calculate the DISD variable. The control variables in the 
model include firm size (LnSales), CEO tenure, the ratio of cash to total assets, leverage 
(TL/TA), the market-to-book ratio, firm age, the sales growth rate, dividend payout (cash 
dividends/sales), the one-year stock return, governance measures—including a business 
common law (BCL) dummy—and board size. These controls are measured in the period 
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t. In another regression, we use controls measured in the period t - 1 to determine if the 
results change. 
In addition to the base model, we expand our investigation by using different levels of 
CEO overconfidence. We change the CEO overconfidence dummy to a high-/low-
overconfidence dummy and then examine the effects of different levels of CEO 
overconfidence on firm risk taking behavior when deviations occur. 
4.6 Data and sample selection 
To construct our sample, we use two data sets that are available from Wharton Research 
Data Services. We retrieve firm financial variables from Compustat, and CEO variables 
are obtained from ExecuComp. The initial sample consists of the intersection of firms 
included in both databases. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission increased 
disclosure requirements for all U.S. public firms after 2006 to include CEO inside debt. 
Because of this limitation, our sample period spans from 2006 to 2017. This study 
employs a sample of U.S. public firms, excluding firms that trade as American depositary 
receipts and firms operating in the utility sector (Standard Industrial Classification, or 
SIC, codes 4900–4999) or the financial sector (SIC codes 6000–6999). We delete 
observations missing data for key variables and winsorize all variables at the first and 
99th percentiles. The final sample in this study consists of 1,706 firms, 2,449 CEOs, and 
9.736 observations in total. However, because of missing data on CEO attributes, the 
final samples used to test each hypothesis are different. The variable definitions are given 




5.1 Sample descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample, including the mean, median, 
standard deviation, and 25th and 75th percentiles. The first part of Table 1 presents the 
variables associated with firm characteristics. All the firm-level variables’ distribution 
statistics are consistent with those reported in the literature. The second part of Table 1 
shows the variables associated with CEO characteristics. CEOs’ relative debt-to-equity 
ratio (k) has a mean (median) of 0.3035 (0.061), and CEOs’ relative incentive ratio (k*) 
has a mean (median) of 9.058 (0.5279). These two ratios are consistent with the summary 
statistics of Wei and Yermack (2011) and Campbell et al. (2016). Table 1 also includes 
summary statistics for our optimal ratio and deviation variable estimates. The mean and 
median of our predicted values of k and k* are similar to those of Campbell et al., (2016). 
Insert Table 1 here 
5.2 Main results 
5.2.1 Target inside debt level and deviations 
To estimate the optimum, or target, inside debt level, we follow the methodology of 
Campbell et al. (2016). For both the relative CEO leverage ratio (k) and relative CEO 
incentive ratio (k*), we estimate the following first-stage regression models, using all 
available data, and then use the fitted values as our target ratios:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑘) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛾3 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 
 + 𝛾4 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛾5 𝑅&𝐷/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾6 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑃&𝐸/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
+𝛾7 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛾8 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾9 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝜀 
                                                                                                                       (1) 
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𝑙𝑛(𝑘 ∗) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾2 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛾3 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 
 +𝛾4 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛾5 𝑅&𝐷/𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾6 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑃&𝐸/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
+ 𝛾7 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛾8 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾9 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝜀 
                                                                                                                         (2) 
After computing the fitted value in model (1), we set it as the target value of ratio k. We 
use the actual k value minus the target value of the ratio k and we name this deviation 
variable DISD1, the deviation from the target inside debt k of model (1). We follow the 
same steps for model (2) and name the deviation of model (2) DISD2, the deviation from 
the target inside debt k* of model (2). 
Table 2 reports the univariate analysis of our deviation variables. We separate our sample 
into several subsamples. We note in Table 2 that the mean difference between 
overconfident CEOs and non-overconfident CEOs is negative for DISD1 and DISD2; 
that is, relative to non-overconfident CEOs, overconfident CEOs tend to have negative 
deviations. In other words, overconfident CEOs are associated with inside debt that is 
below the target level. The mean of DISD2 (DISD1) for overconfident CEOs is -2.5091 
(-0.9028), whereas the mean of DISD2 (DISD1) for non-overconfident CEOs is 0.9406 
(0.3347). For both DISD1 and DISD2, highly overconfident CEOs tend to have a greater 
negative deviation from the target inside debt level than CEOs with lower levels of 
overconfidence. 
Insert Table 2 here 
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5.2.2  Firm risk taking activity 
We use two proxies for measuring firm risk taking, namely, R&D expenditures and 
capital expenditures. R&D expenditures are defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to 
total assets, R&D/TA (Opler and Titman, 1994; Mehran, 1995; Cassell et al., 2012), and 
capital expenditures are defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, 
CAPEX/TA (Cassel et al., 2012). 
To examine the relation between firm risk taking and deviations from the optimal inside 
debt level, we follow the model of prior studies by adding the overconfidence dummy 
variable to the standard firm risk taking model, as follows: 
Investment Activityi,t = ∝0 + 𝛽1DISD2(i,t-1)*Overconfidence Dummy + 
𝛽2DISD2(i,t-1) + 𝛽3Overconfidence Dummy + 𝛽4Control variables𝑖,𝑡  + Fixed 
effects + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (3) 
The regression results of model (3) are presented in Table 3. In column 1, the dependent 
variable, R&D/TA, includes all observations in the sample. Column 2 presents the results 
of the absolute value of inside debt deviation, while Columns 3 and 4 differ in terms of 
the sign of the deviation. Column 3 shows the results of positive inside debt deviations, 
and column 4 presents the results of negative inside debt deviations. The results of 
different levels of overconfidence (high vs. low) are also included in Table 3. 
Table 3 shows several important findings. First, consistent with previous research, CEO 
overconfidence is positively associated with firm risk taking activity. Columns 1 and 2 of 
Panel A show that the coefficients of the overconfidence dummy, the high 
overconfidence dummy, and the low-overconfidence dummy are all positive. Second, the 
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last two columns of Panel A present the results of positive and negative deviations, 
respectively. Given negative deviations, the coefficients of the overall overconfidence 
and low-overconfidence dummies are both positive and significant. These results suggest 
that negative deviations of inside debt escalate the risk taking behavior of firms with 
overconfident CEOs. Thus, the results provide support for H2. By contrast, given positive 
deviations, the coefficients become negative. However, these results are not statistically 
significant in this case. 
These coefficients do become significant when we use DISD1 as the control variable, as 
well as when we use the controls measured in the period t - 1. Detail results are given in 
Section 6 on robustness checks. 
Third, we also find that our deviation variable is negatively related to the dependent 
variable. The first two columns of Table 3 show a negative coefficient of the variable 
DISD2. The results are more significant when we use the absolute value of the 
deviations. The results indicate that, when deviations exist, firms will decrease their risk 
taking behavior. 
We also create a dummy variable for positive deviations, which we set equal to one if the 
inside debt deviation is positive, and zero if negative. Then we run the model as follows 
to test the different effects of firm risk taking behavior based on different signs of the 
deviation: 
Investment Activityi,t = ∝0 + 𝛽1Positive DEV + 𝛽2Positive DEV 
*Overconfidence Dummy + 𝛽3Overconfidence Dummy + 𝛽4Control variables𝑖,𝑡 
+ Fixed effects + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (3A) 
78 
 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the estimation results for model (3A). We find that the 
variable for positive inside debt deviations interacts with the variable for overconfident 
CEOs, mitigating firm risk taking activities. The coefficient of our interaction 
variable, -Positive DEV*Overconfident Dummy, is negative and significant at the 10% 
level. 
More in detail, in our model, once we add the interaction term, the effect of the 
overconfident dummy on R&D activity becomes 0.0038 - 0.0042*Positive dummy. For 
positive deviations, Positive = 1, so the effect of CEO overconfidence on risk taking will 
become 0.0038 - 0.0042 = -0.0004, indicating that positive inside debt deviations will 
alleviate overconfident CEO risk taking behavior. The results are more pronounced for 
CEOs with high levels of overconfidence. After the interaction term Positive DEV*High 
- Overconfidence is added, the effect of high levels of overconfidence on risk taking 
become 0.0064 - 0.0126 = -0.0062. Previous studies point out a positive relation between 
CEO overconfidence and corporate risk taking behavior. The results from Panel B of 
Table 3 provide evidence that positive inside deviations will mitigate the risk taking 
behavior of firms with overconfident CEOs. 
Panel C of Table 3 presents the results when the dependent variable is Capex/TA. The 
overall results show a positive correlation between CEO overconfidence and firm capital 
expenditures. However, Panel C shows that overconfident CEOs will increase capital 
expenditures given either a positive or a negative inside debt deviation. Our overall 
confidence dummy and dummy for high overconfidence are highly significant (p-value < 
0.01) for all situations. 
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Panel D of Table 3 presents the results of equation (3A), where the dependent variable is 
Capex/TA. As in Panel C, we find that overconfidence is positively related to capital 
expenditures. We find that the coefficient of Positive DEV*Overconfidence is positive, 
indicating that CEOs will increase capital expenditures when their inside debt is above 
target levels. However, the t-test results are nonsignificant but approaching marginal 
levels of significance. 
Collectively, some results in Table 3 (Panels A and B) are consistent with H1 and H2. 
Column 4 of Panel A suggests that negative inside debt deviations will increase the risk 
taking activities of firms with overconfident CEOs. This result is therefore in line with 
H2. Panel B presents a negative coefficient of the interaction variable Positive 
Dev*Overconfidence. The results are significant for both the overall overconfidence 
dummy and the dummy for high overconfidence. These results therefore indicate that 
positive inside debt deviations will mitigate the risk taking behavior of firms with 
overconfident CEOs. Therefore, these results support H1. 
The results of Panel C of Table 3 show no differences in the effects of CEO 
overconfidence on the riskiness of firm investment activity between positive and negative 
deviations. The results of Panel D show the same finding as in Panels A and B, but 
without statistical significance. 
Insert Table 3 here 
5.2.3 Riskiness of firm financial policies 
We capture the riskiness of firm financial policies by focusing on firm leverage and cash 
levels. Our measurement of leverage is defined as total liability scaled by total assets. We 
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measure a firm’s cash level as total cash divided by total assets. Previous studies also 
show a negative relation between firm leverage and CEO inside debt and a positive 
relation between firm liquidity (cash level) and CEO inside debt (Cassell et al., 2012). 
To examine the relation between the riskiness of firm financial policies and deviation of 
the optimal inside debt level, we add the overconfidence dummy variable to the model of 
prior study, as follows: 
Leverage or Cash leveli,t =∝0 + 𝛽1DISD2(i,t-1)*Overconfidence Dummy + 
𝛽2DISD2(i,t-1) + 𝛽3 Overconfidence Dummy + 𝛽4Control variables𝑖,𝑡 + 
Fixed effects + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (4) 
The results of model (4) are presented in Table 4, which has a similar layout as that of 
Table 3. Consistent with previous studies (Malmendier et al., 2011; Atkas et al., 2019), 
our overconfidence dummy is negative and significantly (p-value < 0.01) related to firm 
leverage in all situations. We found a rather surprising outcome in column 2: the 
coefficient is positive and significant (0.0096, p-value < 0.01) for the interaction variable 
DISD2*High-overconfidence. Furthermore, the coefficient is negative and significant 
(-0.0014, p- value < 0.05) for the interaction variable DISD2*Low-overconfidence, 
indicating different effects for high compared to low levels of overconfidence. The 
results are consistent with previous studies (Engelen et al., 2015; Yung, Li, and Sun, 
2015). 
Even though the coefficients of the overall overconfidence dummy are negative for both 
positive and negative deviations (columns 3 and 4, respectively, in Table 4), 
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overconfident CEOs will tend to lower firm leverage under both scenarios, and the 
amount of the decrease is smallest for negative inside debt deviations. 
The results of Panel B in Table 4 show a positive correlation between CEO 
overconfidence and firm leverage, given positive inside debt. The coefficient of the 
interaction variable Positive DEV*Overconfidence is 0.0502 and significant at the 5% 
level. Positive deviations of inside debt mitigate the incentives of overconfident CEOs to 
lower firm leverage. These results are also reported by Cassell et al. (2012), who argue 
that there is a positive relation between CEO inside debt level and firm leverage; this 
means that higher CEO inside debt is associated with greater firm leverage. 
Panel C of Table 4 presents the results of model (4) where the dependent variable is the 
cash level (Cash/Total Assets). Even though previous studies find that overconfident 
CEOs prefer internal financing and thus hoard cash (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012), this differs 
from the finding presented here. Some researchers hold the opposite view. For example, 
Ferris et al. (2013) argue that CEO overconfidence is negatively associated with cash 
levels. A possible explanation for this could be dependent on the sufficiency of internal 
funds. When a firm has insufficient internal funds, overconfident CEOs will hoard cash, 
and once internal funds are sufficient, overconfident CEOs, compared to rational CEOs, 
will use this cash faster. This situation has also been reported by Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) and Malmendier, Tate, and Jon (2011). Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that 
overconfident CEOs will overinvest in risky projects when the firm has enough internal 
funds, thus leading to low cash levels. This argument explains the negative relation 
between overconfidence and cash levels. By contrast, when external funds are needed, 
overconfident CEOs will hoard cash and underinvest. This explains the positive relation 
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between overconfidence and cash levels. Further study with greater focus on financial 
constraint is therefore suggested. 
Taking a close look at the results, we find that the deviation variables are positively 
related to firm cash levels. However, the results of Panel C in Table 4 show no 
differences between positive and negative deviations. Under both situations, our overall 
overconfident dummy and dummy for high overconfidence are negatively related to firm 
cash levels. We do find a different sign on the coefficient of the low-overconfidence 
dummy, but it is nonsignificant for negative deviations. 
Panel D of Table 4 presents the results after we add the dummy variable Positive and the 
interaction variable to model (4). The overall results are consistent with those in Panel C. 
Overconfident CEOs will lower the firm’s cash level given positive deviations. However, 
the amount of the decrease will be smaller for positive deviations compared to negative 
deviations. The effect of positive deviations on cash levels is -0.009 + 0.0033 = -0.0057 
when inside debt levels are above target levels, compared to -0.009 when inside debt 
levels are below target levels. Nevertheless, the interaction variable is approaching—but 
does not reach—a marginal level of significance. Another important finding is that the 
signs of Positive Dev*High overconfidence and Positive Dev* Low overconfidence are 
different. The interaction variable Positive Dev* High overconfidence is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that positive inside debt deviations interact with 
high overconfidence to mitigate the decrease in cash levels. On the other side, Positive 
Dev * Low overconfidence is negative and significant, which implies that positive 
deviations escalate the inclination of low-overconfidence CEOs to reduce cash. Previous 
research finds a nonlinear effect of overconfidence for higher levels of overconfidence, 
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with greater effects for higher levels (Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Engelen et al., 2015; Yung, 
Li and Sun, 2015). The need for external financing can partly explain the positive 
coefficient for high-overconfidence CEOs and the negative coefficient for low-
overconfidence CEOS. Compared to low-overconfidence CEOs, high-overconfidence 
CEOs expect firms to have higher needs for external financing, and they believe external 
financing to be costly; therefore, they are more likely to underinvest and to save cash. 
In summary, the results of Table 4 are not very encouraging. The overall results show 
that overconfident CEOs lower firm leverage and cash levels under all situations. 
However, the results are unable to demonstrate the different effects of inside debt 
deviations on the riskiness of firms with overconfident CEOs. 
Insert Table 4 here 
5.2.4 Effects of deviation from optimal inside debt on firm value 
The results of the tests investigating H3 are presented in Table 5. Using the specifications 
of the valuation regression of Fama and French (1998), we add our overconfidence 
dummy to examine the relation between deviations from optimal inside debt levels and 
firm value. The modified model is as follows: 
MV_TA =∝0 + 𝛽1DISD2 + 𝛽2overconfidence + 𝛽3DISD2*overconfidence + 
𝛽4Fama French variables + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                    (5) 
The detailed explanations for the Fama–French variables are included in the Appendix. 
Meanwhile, we also investigate the effects of different levels of CEO overconfidence on 
firm value, using our high- and low-overconfidence dummies. Table 5 provides the 
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experimental data for model (5). Similar to the other tables, Table 5 presents the results 
for model (5) under four scenarios: all observations, unsigned (absolute value) 
observations, observations of positive deviations, and observations of negative 
deviations. Panel A reports the results of the estimation of model (5) in which the key 
independent variable is DISD2 (deviation of the inside debt ratio k*). 
The results of Table 5 generally show that our deviation variable (DISD2) is significantly 
positively related to firm value (p-value < 0.01 in the columns for all and unsigned 
observations). Consistent with previous findings, our overconfidence dummies are also 
positively related to firm value (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Gervais et al., 2011). Even 
though the coefficients in both the positive and negative deviation cases share the same 
sign, the positive effects are strong when CEO inside debt is above the optimal level. The 
coefficient for the overconfidence dummy is 0.4298 for a positive deviation, which is 
higher than 0.2152 for a negative inside debt deviation. We find the same patterns for our 
high-/low-overconfidence variables. These results show that positive inside debt 
deviations are associated with higher increases in firm value when the CEO is 
overconfident. 
Panel B of Table 5 presents results consistent with those of Panel A. The coefficients of 
the overall overconfidence dummy, the high-overconfidence dummy, and the low-
overconfidence dummy are all positive and significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, CEO 




To sum up, the results of Table 5 only partially support H3. We do not find a negative 
relation between CEO overconfidence and firm value under negative deviations. Instead, 
we find that CEO overconfidence is positively associated with firm value under both 
positive and negative deviations, but the positive effect is much stronger if the CEO’s 
actual inside debt level is above the estimated target. 
Insert Table 5 here 
6. Robustness tests for the main analyses 
6.1 Using DISD1 as the main control variable 
In Section 5, for all our regressions, we use DISD2 as the key variable, where DISD2 is 
the deviation from the target inside debt k* of model (2). Here, we switch to using 
DISD1, which is the deviation from the target inside debt k of model (1), as the key 
control variable. The difference between DISD1 and DISD2 has already been covered in 
previous sections. 
Table 6 presents the results of models (3) to (5) while using DISD1 as the key control 
variable. Panels A and B present the new results of model (3), where the dependent 
variable is RD/TA. The overall results are in line with the results in Table 3. We note in 
Panel A that the coefficient of the high-overconfidence dummy is negative and 
significant under positive deviations, and positive and significant under negative 
deviations (-0.0080 for positive deviations, 0.0071 for negative deviations, p-value < 
0.1). These results thus support both H1 and H2. Panel B further supports H1, in that 
positive inside debt deviations mitigate the risk taking activities of firms with 
overconfident CEOs. The coefficients for the interaction variables in Panel B are negative 
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and significant for the overall overconfidence dummy and the high-overconfidence 
dummy (-0.0042, at the 1% level of significance, and -0.0126, at the 5% level). 
Panels C and D of Table 6 present results that are consistent with those of Table 3. CEO 
overconfidence has a positive effect on a firm’s capital expenditures, but the results fail 
to identify any effects that differ between negative and positive deviations.  
The new results of model (4) where leverage is the dependent variable are presented in 
Panels E and F of Table 6. We found that the overall results are consistent with those of 
Panels A and B in Table 4. The results of Panel E of Table 6 show that overconfident 
CEOs will lower firm leverage, given both negative and positive deviations, but the effect 
of the decrease is smaller given negative deviations. 
Panels G and H of Table 6 present the results when the cash level is the dependent 
variable. Panel G shows that the overconfidence dummy is negatively related to firm cash 
levels under all situations, indicating a negative correlation between CEO overconfidence 
and corporate cash levels. The cash level is lowest when the CEO’s inside debt is below 
the target level, which is associated with the highest level of financial risk. This result 
provides evidence that CEO overconfidence will increase corporate risk taking under 
negative deviations. These results further support H2. Panel H shows a positive 
correlation between CEO overconfidence and firm cash levels when the deviations of 
inside debt are positive. However, the results are nonsignificant. 
The new results of model (5), using DISD1 as the key control variable, are shown in 
Panels I and G of Table 6. The results of Panel I are in line with those in Table 5. We find 
CEO overconfidence is positively related to firm value, and the positive effect is stronger 
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when the CEO’s inside debt is above the target level (0.3913 compared to 0.2262 for 
negative deviations, both at the 1% level of significance). Therefore, overconfident CEOs 
mitigate risk aversion when their inside debt is above the optimum and are thus 
associated with a positive impact on firm value, which partially supports H3. 
Insert Table 6 here 
6.2 Measuring the control variable in period t - 1 
The controls variables are measured in period t in Section 5. In all the regressions in this 
section, we use controls measured in the period t - 1, instead, to see if the results change. 
Because the Fama–French variables in model (5) are already calculated in periods t - 1 
and t - 2, in this section we therefore present only the results of models (3) and (4). By 
using a one-year-lagged variable for all the control variables, the new models should look 
like the following: 
Investment Activityi,t = ∝0 + 𝛽1DISD2(i,t-1)*Overconfidence Dummy + 
𝛽2DISD2(i,t-1) + 𝛽3 Overconfidence Dummy + 𝛽4 Control variables(i,t-1) + Fixed 
effects + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         (3B) 
Leverage or Cash leveli,t = ∝0 + 𝛽1DISD2(i,t-1)*Overconfidence Dummy + 
𝛽2DISD2(i,t-1) + 𝛽3 Overconfidence Dummy + 𝛽4 Control variables(i,t-1) + Fixed 
effects + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (4A) 
The results of these models are presented in Table 7. Panel A shows the results of model 
(3B), where the dependent variable is RD/AT. The results are consistent with those in 
Panel A of Table 3 and Panel A of Table 6. We find that the coefficient is negative and 
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significant when the CEO’s inside debt is above the target level and positive and 
significant when the CEO’s inside debt level is below the target level, especially for the 
high-overconfidence dummy (coefficients of -0.0093 and 0.0102, respectively, at the 
10% level of significance). Thus, this finding supports both H1 and H2. 
Panel B of Table 7 provides the results of model (3B), where the dependent variable is 
CAPX/AT. The overall results are in line with our previous findings , in that 
overconfident CEOs will increase firm capital expenditures. However, only the results 
under positive deviations are significant in this case. 
Panels C and D of Table 7 present the results of model (4A). The overall results match 
our previous results. We find a different sign for the overconfidence dummy when we run 
the cash-level regressions, compared to previously (e.g., Table 4 of Panel C). The 
different sign indicates that overconfident CEOs will increase cash levels given positive 
deviations, and decrease cash levels given negative deviations. However, the results are 
not statistically significant. 
Insert Table 7 here 
Overall, the results of this section are in line with our findings in Section 5. The results of 
multiple regression provide support for H1 to H3. 
7. Summary and conclusions 
In this study, we investigate the relation between CEO overconfidence and CEO inside 
debt levels. Unlike prior studies that focus only on the effects of CEO inside debt on firm 
risk taking behavior, we also investigate the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm risk 
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taking activities given deviations from optimal levels. Our results show that deviations in 
inside debt play an important role in these relations. 
Specifically, positive deviations of inside debt mitigate the risk taking behaviors of firms 
with overconfident CEOs. We use different methodologies to estimate the inside debt 
level and the optimal level. We also use different methodologies to estimate a firm’s 
investment riskiness and financial policy riskiness. Using R&D as a way to estimate 
investment risk, we find that a positive deviation is negatively related to firm risk taking 
behaviors when the CEO is considered overconfident. We also find that CEO 
overconfidence will always increase the firm’s capital expenditures, without the influence 
of deviations in inside debt. When we examine the effect of CEO overconfidence on the 
risk of financial policy, we find that CEO overconfidence is negatively related to firm 
leverage. This result indicates that overconfident CEOs will decrease firm leverage under 
both positive and negative deviations in inside debt. However, we do find that the amount 
of the decrease is smaller when the inside debt deviation is negative. On the other hand, 
when we investigate the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm cash levels, we find that 
overconfident CEOs tend to lower firm cash levels. We also find that if a CEO’s inside 
debt is above the target level, the amount of the decrease is smaller. However, the results 
are nonsignificant. The results also show that low-overconfidence CEOs will increase 
amounts of cash when their inside debt is above the target level, but high-overconfidence 
CEOs will decrease cash levels. Nevertheless, the results are also statistically 
nonsignificant. 
Additionally, we examine the moderating effects of CEO inside debt on firm value. We 
confirm the positive relation between deviations from the target inside debt level and firm 
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value. Our results also show that CEO overconfidence has a positive effect on firm value. 
This positive effect is more significant for positive deviations of inside debt than for 
negative deviations. 
In spite of its limitations, this study adds to the literature on the effects of the deviations 
of inside debt levels on firm risk taking activity and firm value. Although the current 
study is based on a small data set on CEO inside debt, the findings show hints that 
different signs of CEO inside debt deviation will have different influences on firm value 
and risk. More information on CEO inside debt would help establish greater accuracy in 
this matter. Further research could explore not only the signs of the deviations of inside 
debt, but also the levels of the deviations, to closely examine the link between different 




Table 1  Descriptive Statistics 
Firm characteristics       
Name N Mean Std.Dev 25th  Median 75th 
Firm equity 8,525 7,486.6040 15,625.9300 731.2880 2,007.4320 6,033.0270 
Firm debt 8,941 2,480.2870 5,562.4260 144.4500 549.0000 1,947.0000 
Firm debt to equity ratio 8,525 0.5271 1.3862 0.0945 0.2435 0.5440 
Firm leverage 8,941 0.5822 0.2378 0.4321 0.5683 0.7123 
Book leverage 8,941 0.2122 0.1924 0.0784 0.1887 0.3024 
Market to book ratio 8,525 1.7254 0.9302 1.1465 1.4553 1.9859 
Idiosyncratic risk 8,940 -3.9419 0.5049 -4.3106 -3.9727 -3.6264 
Ln(asset) 8,941 7.9369 1.6305 6.7738 7.8240 8.9681 
Ln(sale) 8,535 7.6295 1.5414 6.5960 7.5455 8.6413 
R&D expense/total asset 8,941 0.0241 0.0528 0.0000 0.0000 0.0250 
Sale growth rate 6,812 0.0218 0.2423 -0.0275 0.0490 0.1194 
Dividend payour 8,372 0.0157 0.0259 0.0000 0.0035 0.0212 
Capital expenditure 8,515 0.0471 0.0528 0.0164 0.0319 0.0587 
Boardsize 8,187 9.4910 2.3457 8.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
Firm age 4,101 14.3787 6.2015 10.0000 14.0000 19.0000 
BCL dummy 8,941 0.9941 0.0768 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Delaware dummy 8,941 0.6260 0.4839 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Firm equity delta` 8,941 219.7709 438.4413 36.9895 73.9248 183.2080 
       
CEO characteristics             
CEO age 8,889 55.8215 6.6980 51.0000 56.0000 60.0000 
CEO overconfident dummy 8,941 0.2693 0.4436 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CEO tenure(years) 8,941 6.8082 6.7002 2.0000 5.0000 9.0000 
CEO equity 8,941 88,299.2800 1,020,448.0000 6,081.5250 15,522.3700 40,239.1100 
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CEO debt 8,941 4,603.5490 7,156.7080 0.0000 1,021.3130 6,095.3610 
CEO debt to equity ratio 8,941 0.3019 0.6146 0.0000 0.0614 0.3167 
CEO equity delta 8,941 989.1521 10,353.8500 76.5698 205.9525 540.0865 
CEO relative debt to equity ratio (K) 8,941 0.3036 0.6248 0.0000 0.0614 0.3167 
CEO relative incentive ratio (K*) 8,941 9.0581 42.0224 0.0000 0.5279 2.8578 
       
Estimated Optimal ratio             
CEO relative debt to equity ratio* 8,246 2.5249 2.1845 1.4056 2.6187 3.8814 
CEO relative incentive ratio* 8,246 6.4502 4.8968 3.6438 6.4636 9.6276 
       
Deviations             
DISD1 (Actual k-estimate k) 8,246 -0.0091 9.7304 -2.9816 -1.4694 0.0026 












Table 2 Univariate test table 















DISD2 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mean  -0.0179 -2.5091 -3.8983 -2.3784 -2.1552 0.9406 
Median -3.8741 -4.7184 -6.0668 -5.0373 -4.0919 -3.5407 
       
DISD1 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mean -0.0091 -0.9028 -1.2220 -0.7573 -0.8874 0.3347 
Median -1.4694 -2.1365 -2.7567 -2.2167 -1.9293 -1.2457 
       
DISD2 1 vs 2 1 vs 3 1 vs 4 1 vs 6 2 vs 6 3 vs 5  
Difference between means 2.4912 3.8805 2.3606 -0.9584 -3.4496 -1.7432 
difference between medians 0.8443 2.1927 1.1632 -0.3334 -1.1777 -1.9749 
       
DISD1 1 vs 2 1 vs 3 1 vs 4 1 vs 6 2 vs 6 3 vs 5  
Difference between means 0.8936 1.2129 0.7481 0.6653 -1.2374 -0.3346 






 Table 3 Panel A 
  
Unsigned DISD2 Abs(DISD2) Positive DISD2 Negative DISD2 
RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA 
DISD2 -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001**     
Oveconf_dummy 0.0035**  0.0035**  -0.0001  0.0034***  
DISD2*Overconf. 0.0001  0.0000      
DISD2*High_over  0.0001  0.0000     
DISD2*Low_over  0.0001  0.0000     
High_over  0.0061*  0.0064  -0.0055  0.0062 
Low_over  0.0037**  0.0035*  0.0020  0.0040** 
Ceo tenure 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002** 0.0003** 
Ln(sales) -0.0048*** -0.0048*** -0.0049*** -0.0049*** -0.0039*** -0.0039*** -0.0050*** -0.0050*** 
Cash/ta 0.1905*** 0.1908*** 0.1912*** 0.1913*** 0.2212*** 0.2211*** 0.1703*** 0.1704*** 
Salesgrowth 0.0198*** 0.0198*** 0.0197*** 0.0197*** 0.0236*** 0.0237*** 0.0202*** 0.0202*** 
ROA -0.1300*** -0.1293*** -0.1305*** -0.1297*** -0.1534*** -0.1532*** -0.1280*** -0.1274*** 
TL/TA -0.0063*** -0.0062*** -0.0068*** -0.0069*** -0.0059* -0.0056 -0.0112*** -0.0111*** 
Stock return 0.0171*** 0.0173*** 0.0175*** 0.0176*** 0.0227*** 0.0228*** 0.0134*** 0.0136*** 
Firm age -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
Dividend payout 0.0976*** 0.0960*** 0.0952*** 0.0939*** 0.1115*** 0.1093*** 0.0558* 0.0550* 
BCL dummy -0.0335*** -0.0334*** -0.0333*** -0.0333*** -0.0131 -0.0130 -0.0410*** -0.0409*** 
Board size 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007* 0.0007* 
Intercept 0.0986*** 0.0983*** 0.0994*** 0.0994*** 0.0553*** 0.0559*** 0.1199*** 0.1196*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes YEs Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.2390 0.2392 0.2389 0.2391 0.3198 0.3203 0.2166 0.2169 
N 5,150 5,150 5,150 5,150 2,241 2,241 3,982 3,982 
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Table 3 Panel B 
All OBS 
RD/AT RD/AT RD/AT 
Positive Dummy 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0007 
POS*OverCon -0.0042*     
Overconfidence 0.0038**     
Pos*High OC   -0.0126**  
POS*Low OC    -0.0018 
High Overconfidence   0.0064*  
Low Overcon    0.0038** 
Ceo tenure 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Ln(sales) -0.0046*** -0.0047*** -0.0047*** 
Cash/ta 0.1910*** 0.1915*** 0.1910*** 
Salesgrowth 0.0217*** 0.0220*** 0.0219*** 
ROA -0.1401*** -0.1382*** -0.1392*** 
TL/TA -0.0082*** -0.0082*** -0.0082*** 
Stock return 0.0176*** 0.0181*** 0.0178*** 
Firm age -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
Dividend payout 0.0819*** 0.0790*** 0.0807*** 
BCL dummy -0.0252*** -0.0247*** -0.0251*** 
Board size 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
Intercept .0906*** 0.0907*** 0.0915*** 
Number of Obs 6,223 6,223 6,223 






 Table 3 Panel C 
Unsigned DISD2 Abs(DISD2) Positive DISD2 Negative DISD2 
CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA 
DISD2 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000     
Oveconf_dummy 0.0067***   0.0061***   0.0064**   0.0060***   
DISD2*Overconf. 0.0000   0.0001         
DISD2*High_over   0.0000   0.0006       
DISD2*Low_over   -0.0001   0.0001       
High_over   0.0160***   0.0117*   0.0149***   0.0174*** 
Low_over   0.0029   0.0027   0.0001   0.0042* 
Ceo tenure -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Ln(sales) -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0021*** -0.0020*** 
Cash/ta -0.1126*** -0.1114*** -0.1141*** -0.1132*** -0.0762*** -0.0752*** -0.1246*** -0.1241*** 
Salesgrowth 0.0053** 0.0055* 0.0055* 0.0056* 0.0072* 0.0075** 0.0058 0.0055 
ROA 0.0188** 0.0209** 0.0179** 0.0197** 0.0377*** 0.0398*** 0.0170 0.0179* 
TL/TA 0.0010 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0034 -0.0039 0.0023 0.0023 
Stock return 0.0011 0.0017 0.0011 0.0015 -0.0036 -0.0027 0.0059 0.0061 
Firm age 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Dividend payout 0.0406 0.0376 0.0378 0.0349 -0.0566* -0.0583* 0.0690* 0.0697* 
BCL dummy 0.0024 0.0030 0.0034 0.0039 0.0121 0.0125 -0.0029 -0.0024 
Board size -0.0011*** -0.0011** -0.0011** -0.0011** -0.0010* -0.0010* -0.0015** -0.0015*** 
Intercept 0.0692*** 0.0677*** 0.0691*** 0.0683*** 0.0551*** 0.0544*** 0.0866*** 0.0848*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes YEs Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.0587 0.0593 0.0568 0.0578 0.0511 0 .0520 0.0596   0.0605 




Table 3 Panel D 
All OBS 
CAPX/AT CAPX/AT CAPX/AT 
Positive Dummy -0.0055*** -0.0052*** -0.0047*** 
POS*OverCon 0.0022     
Overconfidence 0.0053***     
Pos*High OC   0.0001  
POS*Low OC    -0.0028 
High Overconfidence   0.0158***  
Low Overcon    0.0027 
Ceo tenure -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
Ln(sales) -0.0016*** -0.0015*** -0.0016*** 
Cash/ta -0.1065*** -0.1054*** -0.1057*** 
Salesgrowth 0.0066** 0.0067*** 0.0075*** 
ROA 0.0237*** 0.0261*** 0.0285*** 
TL/TA -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0012 
Stock return 0.0023 0.0029 0.0037 
Firm age 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Dividend payout 0.0059 0.0037 0.0043 
BCL dummy 0.0057 0.0064 0.0069 
Board size -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
Intercept 0.0733*** 0.0717*** 0.0736*** 
Number of Obs 6,214 6,214 6,214 





 Table 4 Panel A 
  
Unsigned DISD2 Abs(DISD2) Positive DISD2 Negative DISD2 
Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
DISD2 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0010*** -0.0011***     
Oveconf_dummy -0.0268***   -0.0257***   -0.0451***   -0.0180***   
DISD2*Overconf. 0.0016***   -0.0007*         
DISD2*High_over   0.0083***   0.0096***       
DISD2*Low_over   0.0011**   -0.0014**       
High_over   -0.0015   -0.1071***   -0.0181   -0.0256** 
Low_over   -0.0241**   -0.0163**   -0.0252   -0.0203** 
Ceo tenure -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** -0.0029*** -0.0031*** -0.0008*** -0.0009** 
Ln(sales) 0.0417*** 0.0416*** 0.0406*** 0.0410*** 0.0373*** 0.0378*** 0.0431*** 0.0431*** 
MB 0.0439*** 0.0428*** 0.0452*** 0.0423*** 0.0729*** 0.0691*** 0.0161*** 0.0159*** 
ROA -0.5525*** -0.5573*** -0.5465*** -0.5541*** -0.4039*** -0.4117*** -0.5873*** -0.5906*** 
PPE_at 0.0655*** 0.0654*** 0.0645*** 0.0643*** 0.0844*** 0.0857*** 0.0438*** 0.0438*** 
RD_at -0.5153*** -0.4997*** -0.5129*** -0.4897*** -0.7683*** -0.7402*** -0.3044*** -0.3011*** 
Stock return 0.0325 0.0306 0.0358 0.0327 0.1392*** 0.1294*** -0.0001 -0.0014 
BCL dummy -0.0150 -0.0158 -0.0277 -0.0310 0.0732 0.0677 -0.0913** -0.0923** 
Board size 0.0028* 0.0029* 0.0020 0.0020 0.0024 0.0025 0.0042** 0.0042** 
Intercept 0.1735*** 0.1739*** 0.2108*** 0.2140*** 0.1137*** 0.1145*** 0.2510*** 0.2516*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.1465 0.1529 0.1506 0.1547 0.1120 0.1089 0.2150 0.2153 




Table 4 Panel B 
All OBS 
Leverage Leverage Leverage 
Positive Dummy 0.1020*** 0.1096*** 0.1143*** 
POS*OverCon 0.0502***     
Overconfidence -0.0324***     
Pos*High OC   0.1611***  
POS*Low OC    0.0052 
High Overconfidence   -0.0412***  
Low Overcon    -0.0182** 
Ceo tenure -0.0015*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** 
Ln(sales) 0.0406*** 0.0405*** 0.0409*** 
MB 0.0375*** 0.0356*** 0.0352*** 
ROA -0.4853*** -0.4946*** -0.4903*** 
PPE_at 0.0538*** 0.0539*** 0.0537*** 
RD_at -0.4694*** -0.4594*** -0.4515*** 
Stock return 0.0319*** 0.0225 0.0266 
BCL dummy 0.0088 0.0052 0.0069 
Board size 0.0025** 0.0025* 0.0025* 
Intercept 0.1503*** 0.1497*** 0.1462*** 
Number of Obs 7,573 7,573 7,573 






 Table 4 Panel C 
Unsigned DISD2 Abs(DISD2) Positive DISD2 Negative DISD2 
Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset 
DISD2 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***     
Oveconf_dummy -0.0071***   -0.0128***   -0.0084***   -0.0082***   
DISD2*Overconf. 0.0002   0.0007***         
DISD2*High_over   0.0001   0.0006       
DISD2*Low_over   0.0001   0.0008***       
High_over   -0.0280***   -0.0325***   -0.0181**   -0.0266*** 
Low_over   0.0004   -0.0057   -0.0120**   0.0001 
Ceo tenure -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
Ln(sales) -0.0101*** -0.0103*** -0.0090*** -0.0092*** -0.0127*** -0.0128*** -0.0099*** -0.0101*** 
MB 0.0180*** 0.0187*** 0.0181*** 0.0187*** 0.0225*** 0.0228*** 0.0164*** 0.0170*** 
ROA 0.0540*** 0.0507*** 0.0495*** 0.0473*** 0.0119 0.0112 0.0769*** 0.0726*** 
PPE_at -0.0487*** -0.0487*** -0.0486*** -0.0487*** -0.0532*** -0.0536*** -0.0483*** -0.0484*** 
RD_at 0.5070*** 0.5023*** 0.5013*** 0.4972*** 0.5513*** 0.5468*** 0.4740*** 0.4699*** 
Stock return -0.0224*** -0.0218*** -0.0229** -0.0227** -0.0084 -0.0082 -0.0247** -0.0244** 
BCL dummy 0.0134 0.0138 0.0129 0.0128 -0.0091 -0.0084 0.0507** 0.0501** 
Board size -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0020*** -0.0021*** -0.0021** -0.0021** -0.0020*** -0.0021*** 
Intercept 0.1746*** 0.1749*** 0.1593*** 0.1603*** 0.2069*** 0.2074*** 0.1388*** 0.1398*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.2641 0.2640 0.2731 0.2747 0.3031 0.3043 0.2517 0.2402 




Table 4 Panel D 
All OBS 
CASH CASH CASH 
Positive Dummy 0.0014 0.0017 0.0042* 
POS*OverCon 0.0033     
Overconfidence -0.0090***     
Pos*High OC   0.0177*  
POS*Low OC    -0.0112* 
High Overconfidence   -0.0298***  
Low Overcon    0.0021 
Ceo tenure -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
Ln(sales) -0.0108*** -0.0109*** -0.0107*** 
MB 0.0189*** 0.0193*** 0.0180*** 
ROA 0.0463*** 0.0430*** 0.0429*** 
PPE_at -0.0504*** -0.0504*** -0.0506*** 
RD_at 0.5042*** 0.5013*** 0.5091*** 
Stock return -0.0181** -0.0182** -0.0177** 
BCL dummy 0.0136 0.0134 0.0201 
Board size -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0022*** 
Intercept 0.1776*** 0.1782*** 0.1768*** 
Number of Obs 7,460 7,460 7,460 








 Table 5 Panel A 
All OBS Abs Obs Positive Obs Negative Obs 
MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT 
DISD2 0.0018*** 0.0017** 0.0021*** 0.0022***         
DISD2*OverCon 0.0024***   0.0034**           
Overconfidence 0.2844***   0.2512***   0.4298***   0.2152***   
Deviation*High OC   0.0110***   0.0261***         
Deviation*Low OC   0.0019   0.0007         
High Overcon   0.5248***   0.2845***   0.4524***   0.4470*** 
Low Overcon   0.1978***   0.1894***   0.3996***   0.1349*** 
Et 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
d1Et -0.2705* -0.2457* -0.2778* -0.2557** -0.4387* -0.4179* -0.2517* -0.2339* 
d2Et 0.0974 0.0737 0.0912 0.0705 0.4101* 0.3844* -0.0280 -0.0493 
d1At -0.5016*** -0.5057*** -0.4932*** -0.4875*** -0.5069*** -0.4960** -0.5522*** -0.5604*** 
d2At -0.4255*** -0.4060*** -0.4301*** -0.4111*** -0.6637*** -0.6724*** -0.2081*** -0.1859*** 
d1Rd 0.4433 0.5055 0.4337 0.5575 0.6074 0.5807 0.8274 0.8143 
d2Rd 0.2529 0.2600 0.2317 0.2260 0.3652 0.4228 0.8593 0.8836 
d1It -5.0181* -5.1016* -4.9502* -5.0151* -11.8250* -11.8085* -0.7937 -0.9811 
d2It 4.6248*** 4.3413** 4.9457** 4.7418** 11.3587** 11.4140** -0.9206 -1.0944 
d1Dt 0.4315 0.4713 0.4469 0.4926 1.3688** 1.4482** -0.9024* -0.8744* 
d2Dt -0.3020 -0.2997 -0.2985 -0.3214 -0.1891 -0.1484 -0.7885* -0.7557* 
d1Vt 0.4653*** 0.4620*** 0.4634*** 0.4598*** 0.5508*** 0.5514*** 0.4392*** 0.4411*** 
d2Vt 0.4748*** 0.4863*** 0.4756*** 0.4837*** 0.3532*** 0.3717*** 0.5287*** 0.5323*** 
Intercept 0.4883*** 0.5117*** 0.4678*** 0.4904*** 0.5313*** 0.5539*** 0.4632*** 0.4830*** 
Number of Obs 5,331 5331 5331 5331 1,311 1,311 4,037 4,037 






 Table 5 Panel B 
All OBS 
MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT 
Positive Dummy 0.0691*** 0.0749** 0.0576** 
POS*OverCon 0.0999*     
Overconfidence 0.2613***     
Pos*High OC   -0.1109  
POS*Low OC    0.1734** 
High Overcon   0.4778***  
Low Overcon    0.1322*** 
Et 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
d1Et -0.2661* -0.2453* -0.2494* 
d2Et 0.0891 0.0661 0.0718 
d1At -0.5197*** -0.5193*** -0.5286*** 
d2At -0.4179*** -0.3927*** -0.4022*** 
d1Rd 0.4262 0.5175 0.4554 
d2Rd 0.3041 0.3504 0.2556 
d1It -5.0105* -5.2496* -5.2296* 
d2It 4.4221** 4.1957** 4.2572** 
d1Dt 0.4069 0.4765 0.4241 
d2Dt -0.3032 -0.2757 -0.2701 
d1Vt 0.4653*** 0.4737*** 0.4814*** 
d2Vt 0.4757*** 0.4952*** 0.5076*** 
Intercept 0.4726*** 0.5202*** 0.5156*** 
Number of Obs 5,348 5,348 5,348 




 Table 6 Panel A 
Unsigned DISD1 Abs(DISD1) Positive DISD1 Negative DISD1 
RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA 
DISD1 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001         
Oveconf_dummy 0.0027**   0.0021   -0.0005   0.0034**   
DISD1*Overconf. 0.0002   0.0002           
DISD1*High_over   -0.0003   -0.0001         
DISD1*Low_over   0.0004   0.0004         
High_over   0.0022   0.0027   -0.0080*   0.0071* 
Low_over   0.0037**   0.0022   0.0033   0.0032* 
Ceo tenure 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0003** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
Ln(sales) -0.0049*** -0.0050*** -0.0049*** -0.0049*** -0.0045*** -0.0046*** -0.0047*** -0.0047*** 
Cash/ta 0.1901*** 0.1900*** 0.1886*** 0.1884*** 0.2228*** 0.2226*** 0.1708*** 0.1710*** 
Salesgrowth 0.0215*** 0.0215*** 0.0216*** 0.0217*** 0.0173*** 0.0174*** 0.0265*** 0.0265*** 
ROA -0.1424*** -0.1417*** -0.1435*** -0.1427*** -0.1309*** -0.1311*** -0.1467*** -0.1460*** 
TL/TA -0.0076*** -0.0075*** -0.0070*** -0.0069*** -0.0062* -0.0058* -0.0098* -0.0098* 
Stock return 0.0182*** 0.0185*** 0.0181*** 0.0183*** 0.0165*** 0.0166*** 0.0173*** 0.0175*** 
Firm age -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 0 0 -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
Dividend payout 0.1038*** 0.1017*** 0.1042*** 0.1024*** 0.0769*** 0.0750*** 0.0841* 0.0838* 
BCL dummy -0.0288*** -0.0287*** -0.0282*** -0.0282*** -0.0106 -0.0107 -0.0438*** -0.0436*** 
Board size 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 
Intercept 0.0950*** 0.0950*** 0.0941*** 0.0943*** 0.0491*** 0.0502*** 0.1264*** 0.1259*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes YEs Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.239 0.2565 0.2565 0.2568 0.3198 0.3001 0.2166 0.2324 









Table 6 Panel B 
All OBS 
RD/AT RD/AT RD/AT 
Positive Dummy -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0022 
POS*OverCon -0.0039*     
Overconfidence 0.0037**     
Pos*High OC   -0.0161**  
POS*Low OC    -0.0012 
High Overconfidence   0.0076*  
Low Overcon    0.0028* 
Ceo tenure 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Ln(sales) -0.0047*** -0.0047*** -0.0047*** 
Cash/ta 0.1910*** 0.1914*** 0.1910*** 
Salesgrowth 0.0217*** 0.0220*** 0.0219*** 
ROA -0.1402*** -0.1385*** -0.1395*** 
TL/TA -0.0078*** -0.0077*** -0.0078*** 
Stock return 0.0178*** 0.0184*** 0.0180*** 
Firm age -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
Dividend payout 0.0831*** 0.0800*** 0.0820*** 
BCL dummy -0.0254*** -0.0249*** -0.0254*** 
Board size 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
Intercept 0.0912*** 0.0912*** 0.0924*** 
Number of Obs 6,223 6,223 6,223 







  Unsigned DISD1 Abs(DISD1) Positive DISD1 Negative DISD1 
 Table 6 Panel C CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA 
DISD1 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0002         
Oveconf_dummy 0.0063***   0.0059***   0.0061**   0.0062***   
DISD1*Overconf. 0.0001   0.0001           
DISD1*High_over   -0.0001   0.0002         
DISD1*Low_over   -0.0001   0.0001         
High_over   0.0167***   0.0159***   0.0155**   0.0164*** 
Low_over   0.0027*   0.0028   0.0002   0.0042* 
Ceo tenure -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Ln(sales) -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.001 -0.0009 -0.0019** -0.0018** 
Cash/ta -0.1103*** -0.1096*** -0.1093*** -0.1084*** -0.0951*** -0.0940*** -0.1149*** -0.1144*** 
Salesgrowth 0.0067** 0.0067** 0.0067** 0.0067** 0.0025 0.0026 0.0110** 0.0109** 
ROA 0.0215** 0.0229** 0.0220*** 0.0235*** 0.0264** 0.0284** 0.0229** 0.0239** 
TL/TA -0.0006 -0.001- -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0027 -0.0028 
Stock return 0.0034 0.0038 0.0035 0.0039 -0.0045 -0.0039 0.0043 0.0047 
Firm age 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003* 0.0003* 
Dividend payout 0.043 0.0422 0.0426 0.0412 -0.0707* -0.0724* 0.0648* 0.0652* 
BCL dummy 0.0042 0.0046 0.004 0.0044 0.0147 0.0149 -0.0013 -0.0007 
Board size -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
Intercept 0.0719*** 0.0703*** 0.0728*** 0.0712*** 0.0744*** 0.0734*** 0.0723*** 0.0706*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes YEs Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.0563 0.0575 0.0567 0.0579 0.0513 0 .0520 0.0584 0.0598 







Table 6 Panel D 
All OBS 
CAPX/AT CAPX/AT CAPX/AT 
Positive Dummy -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 
POS*OverCon 0.0001     
Overconfidence 0.0062***     
Pos*High OC   0.0004   
POS*Low OC     -0.004 
High Overconfidence   0.0154***   
Low Overcon     0.0032 
Ceo tenure -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Ln(sales) -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0015*** 
Cash/ta -0.1070*** -0.1060*** -0.1063*** 
Salesgrowth 0.0066*** 0.0068*** 0.0076*** 
ROA 0.0239*** 0.0264*** 0.0288*** 
TL/TA -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0027 
Stock return 0.0022 0.0029 0.0036 
Firm age 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Dividend payout -0.0037 -0.0056 -0.0132 
BCL dummy 0.0067 0.0074 0.0079 
Board size -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** 
Intercept 0.0705*** 0.0693*** 0.0710*** 
Number of Obs 6,214 6,214 6,214 







 Table 6 Panel E 
Unsigned DISD1 Abs(DISD1) Positive DISD1 Negative DISD1 
Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
DISD1 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0032*** -0.0032***         
Oveconf_dummy -0.0320***   -0.0327***   -0.0433***   -0.0193***   
DISD1*Overconf. 0.0015*   -0.0009           
DISD1*High_over   0.0043***   -0.0001         
DISD1*Low_over   0.0005   -0.0014         
High_over   -0.0243**   -0.0325**   -0.0084   -0.0349** 
Low_over   -0.0247***   -0.0229**   -0.0284*   -0.0187** 
Ceo tenure -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0021** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
Ln(sales) 0.0419*** 0.0420*** 0.0409*** 0.0410*** 0.0353*** 0.0360*** 0.0435*** 0.0434*** 
MB 0.0417*** 0.0399*** 0.0453*** 0.0432*** 0.0649*** 0.0611*** 0.0225*** 0.0227*** 
ROA -0.5068*** -0.5147*** -0.4889*** -0.4973*** -0.4545*** -0.4629*** -0.5293*** -0.5336*** 
PPE_at 0.0577*** 0.0578*** 0.0545*** 0.0546*** 0.0824*** 0.0837*** 0.0385*** 0.0383*** 
RD_at -0.5081*** -0.4927*** -0.5020*** -0.4882*** -0.7060*** -0.6768*** -0.3369*** -0.3360*** 
Stock return 0.0411** 0.0352 0.0419** 0.0366* 0.1188*** 0.1093*** -0.004 -0.005 
BCL dummy -0.0164 -0.0188 -0.0218 -0.0254 0.0802 0.0749 -0.0804** -0.0813** 
Board size 0.0036** 0.0037** 0.0026* 0.0027* 0.0021 0.0022 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 
Intercept 0.1741*** 0.1744*** 0.2023*** 0.2046*** 0.1352*** 0.1346*** 0.2231*** 0.2240*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.1413 0.1403 0.1562 0.1543 0.1012 0.0984 0.2076 0.208 







Table 6 Panel F 
All OBS 
Leverage Leverage Leverage 
Positive Dummy 0.0643*** 0.0644*** 0.0669 
POS*OverCon 0.0088     
Overconfidence -0.0324***     
Pos*High OC   0.0768***   
POS*Low OC     0.0037 
High Overconfidence   -0.0522***   
Low Overcon     -0.0210** 
Ceo tenure -0.0016*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
Ln(sales) 0.0411*** 0.0410*** 0.0413*** 
MB 0.0398*** 0.0375*** 0.0367*** 
ROA -0.4952*** -0.5073*** -0.5029*** 
PPE_at 0.0549*** 0.0558*** 0.0554*** 
RD_at -0.4800*** -0.4624*** -0.4590*** 
Stock return 0.0376 0.0313 0.0305 
BCL dummy -0.0022 -0.0073 -0.0068 
Board size 0.0035** 0.0036** 0.0037** 
Intercept 0.1445*** 0.1459*** 0.1445*** 
Number of Obs 7,573 7,573 7,573 









  Unsigned DISD1 Abs(DISD1) Positive DISD1 Negative DISD1 
 Table 6 Panel G Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset Cash/Asset 
DISD1 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0010*** 0.0009***         
Oveconf_dummy -0.0074**   -0.0087***   -0.0070*   -0.0086***   
DISD1*Overconf. 0.0001   0.0004           
DISD1*High_over   -0.0005   -0.0005         
DISD1*Low_over   0.0005   0.0012**         
High_over   -0.0241***   -0.0207***   -0.0204**   -0.0246*** 
Low_over   -0.0026   -0.0069**   -0.0106**   -0.0003 
Ceo tenure -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
Ln(sales) -0.0108*** -0.0110*** -0.0104*** -0.0106*** -0.0106*** -0.0108*** -0.0110*** -0.0112*** 
MB 0.0194*** 0.0197*** 0.0182*** 0.0188*** 0.0244*** 0.0249*** 0.0151*** 0.0155*** 
ROA 0.0419*** 0.0397*** 0.0382*** 0.0355*** -0.0088 -0.0091 0.0939*** 0.0897*** 
PPE_at -0.0506*** -0.0506*** -0.0495*** -0.0495*** -0.0516*** -0.0520*** -0.0488*** -0.0488*** 
RD_at 0.5047*** 0.5005*** 0.5036*** 0.4985*** 0.5404*** 0.5343*** 0.4869*** 0.4846*** 
Stock return -0.0174** -0.0174** -0.0177** -0.0178** -0.0018 -0.0012 -0.0308** -0.0310** 
BCL dummy 0.0148 0.0147 0.015 0.015 -0.016 -0.015 0.0510** 0.0502** 
Board size -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0023** -0.0024** -0.0018*** -0.0019*** 
Intercept 0.1773*** 0.1784*** 0.1700*** 0.1704*** 0.1958*** 0.1965*** 0.1468*** 0.1477*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.2636 0.2651 0.2686 0.2706 0.3015 0.303 0.2397 0.2408 







Table 6 Panel H 
All OBS 
CASH CASH CASH 
Positive Dummy 0.0006 0.0016 0.0035 
POS*OverCon 0.0048     
Overconfidence -0.0096***     
Pos*High OC   0.0133   
POS*Low OC     -0.0092 
High Overconfidence   -0.0284***   
Low Overcon     0.0016 
Ceo tenure -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** 
Ln(sales) -0.0108*** -0.0110*** -0.0107*** 
MB 0.0190*** 0.0193*** 0.0180*** 
ROA 0.0463*** 0.0431*** 0.0433*** 
PPE_at -0.0504*** -0.0505*** -0.0503*** 
RD_at 0.5041*** 0.5013*** 0.5097*** 
Stock return -0.0182*** -0.0185*** -0.0203*** 
BCL dummy 0.0135 0.0133 0.012 
Board size -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** 
Intercept 0.1779*** 0.1783*** 0.1772*** 
Number of Obs 7,460 7,460 7,460 









 Table 6 Panel I 
All OBS Abs Obs Positive Obs Negative Obs 
MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT MV/AT 
DISD1 0.0058*** 0.0051*** 0.0106*** 0.0107***         
DISD1*OverCon -0.0023   0.0053**           
Overconfidence 0.2797***   0.2583***   0.3913***   0.2262***   
Deviation*High OC   -0.0033   0.0222***         
Deviation*Low OC   0.0012   0.0033         
High Overcon   0.5004***   0.4000***   0.4060***   0.4882*** 
Low Overcon   0.1969***   0.1858***   0.3597***   0.1443*** 
Et 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
d1Et -0.2931* -0.2705* -0.3054** -0.2800** -0.3726* -0.3627* -0.2426* -0.2217* 
d2Et 0.093 0.0669 0.086 0.061 0.3849* 0.3796* -0.073 -0.102 
d1At -0.4976*** -0.5017*** -0.4784*** -0.4769*** -0.3665** -0.3735** -0.5549*** -0.5596*** 
d2At -0.4384*** -0.4200*** -0.4423*** -0.4250*** -0.5460*** -0.5430*** -0.2754*** -0.2492*** 
d1Rd 0.5011 0.5023 0.4872 0.5239 0.9544 0.8779 0.5413 0.4863 
d2Rd 0.2541 0.2498 0.1193 0.1451 -0.0012 0.0723 1.0145 1.0265 
d1It -5.0719* -5.1810* -5.1544* -5.2374* -9.9667* -9.8990* -1.8282 -1.9901 
d2It 4.6820** 4.4605** 5.3179** 5.0852** 8.0207** 7.9388** 0.3789 0.2285 
d1Dt 0.443 0.4756 0.4463 0.4807 1.4325** 1.4219** -0.0746* -0.0261* 
d2Dt -0.295 -0.2715 -0.2855 -0.2721 -0.2065 -0.1928 -0.4617* -0.4002* 
d1Vt 0.4637*** 0.4634*** 0.4547*** 0.4510*** 0.4182*** 0.4274*** 0.4688*** 0.4660*** 
d2Vt 0.4789*** 0.4885*** 0.4719*** 0.4821*** 0.3137*** 0.3255*** 0.5365*** 0.5412*** 
Intercept 0.4884*** 0.5120*** 0.4518*** 0.4744*** 0.4901*** 0.5089*** 0.4740*** 0.4953*** 
Number of Obs 5,331 5331 5331 5331 1452 1452 3896 3896 





 Table 7 Panel A 
Unsigned DISD2 Positive DISD2 Negative DISD2 
RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA RD/TA 
DISD2 -0.0001*** -0.0001**         
Oveconf_dummy 0.0025*   -0.002   0.0039***   
DISD2*Overconf. 0.0002**           
DISD2*High_over   0.0001         
DISD1*Low_over   0.0002         
High_over   0.0026   -0.0093*   0.0102** 
Low_over   0.0028   0.0001   0.0034 
Ceo tenure(n-1) 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Ln(sales)(n-1) -0.0048*** -0.0049*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0050*** -0.0050*** 
Cash/ta(n-1) 0.1862*** 0.1866*** 0.2199*** 0.2197*** 0.1653*** 0.1656*** 
Salesgrowth(n-1) 0.0191*** 0.0192*** 0.0248*** 0.0250*** 0.0169*** 0.0170*** 
ROA(n-1) -0.1112*** -0.1104*** -0.1043*** -0.1042*** -0.1120*** -0.1120*** 
TL/TA(n-1) -0.0079*** -0.0075*** -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0124*** -0.0124*** 
Stock return(n-1) 0.0162*** 0.0166*** 0.0260*** 0.0265*** 0.0089 0.0095 
Firm age(n-1) -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
Dividend payout(n-1) 0.0756*** 0.0738*** 0.0496 0.0482 0.0582 0.0592 
BCL dummy(n-1) -0.0294*** -0.0291*** -0.0379*** -0.0378*** -0.0069 -0.0067 
Board size(n-1) 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008* 0.0008* 
Intercept 0.0909*** 0.0907*** 0.0710*** 0.0718*** 0.0827*** 0.0824*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes YEs Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.2416 0.2414 0.2883 0.2891 0.2165 0.217 





 Table 7 Panel B 
Unsigned DISD2 Positive DISD2 Negative DISD2 
CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA CAPX/TA 
DISD2 -0.0001** -0.0001**         
Oveconf_dummy 0.0032**   0.0046**   0.0021   
DISD2*Overconf. 0.0001           
DISD2*High_over   0.0001         
DISD1*Low_over   -0.0001         
High_over   0.0062   0.0102**   0.0034 
Low_over   0.0029   0.0009   0.0036 
Ceo tenure(n-1) 0.0001 0 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 0 
Ln(sales)(n-1) -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0021*** -0.0021*** 
Cash/ta(n-1) -0.0921*** -0.0918*** -0.0600*** -0.0592*** -0.1061*** -0.1061*** 
Salesgrowth(n-1) 0.0077*** 0.0078*** 0.0078*** 0.0077*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 
ROA(n-1) 0.0360*** 0.0363*** 0.0396*** 0.0407*** 0.0386*** 0.0383*** 
TL/TA(n-1) -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0002 0 
Stock return(n-1) 0.0072 0.0075 -0.0069 -0.0071 0.0121* 0.0122* 
Firm age(n-1) 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
Dividend payout(n-1) 0.0612** 0.0604** -0.0322 -0.035 0.0907** 0.0912** 
BCL dummy(n-1) 0.0074 0.0076 0.015 0.0152 0.0008 0.0007 
Board size(n-1) -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0014** -0.0014** 
Intercept 0.0595*** 0.0593*** 0.0432*** 0.0426*** 0.0717*** 0.0718*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes YEs Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.0506 0.0507 0.0402 0.0404 0.0544 0.0549 





 Table 7 Panel C 
Unsigned DISD2 Positive DISD2 Negative DISD2 
Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
DISD2 -0.0001 -0.0001         
Oveconf_dummy -0.0257***   -0.0185   -0.0267***   
DISD2*Overconf. 0.0014***           
DISD2*High_over   0.0074***         
DISD2*Low_over   0.0005         
High_over    0.0198   0.0268   -0.0208 
Low_over   -0.0243***   -0.0149   -0.0273*** 
Ceo tenure(n-1) -0.0014*** -0.0015*** -0.0031*** -0.0032*** -0.0004 -0.0005 
Ln(sales)(n-1) 0.0409*** 0.0411*** 0.0378*** 0.0385*** 0.0414*** 0.0416*** 
MB(n-1) 0.0382*** 0.0365*** 0.0866*** 0.0849*** 0.0085*** 0.0074*** 
ROA(n-1) -0.4554*** -0.4609*** -0.5527*** -0.5567*** -0.3926*** -0.3962*** 
PPE_at(n-1) 0.0530*** 0.0532*** 0.0702*** 0.0707*** 0.0421*** 0.0423*** 
RD_at(n-1) -0.5003*** -0.4898*** -0.9560*** -0.9420*** -0.2266*** -0.2194*** 
Stock return(n-1) 0.0414* 0.0372* 0.0451 0.0379 0.0430* 0.0405* 
BCL dummy(n-1) -0.0064 -0.0082 0.0328 0.0289 -0.0282 -0.0304 
Board size(n-1) 0.0032** 0.0034** 0.0005 0.0006 0.0045*** 0.0046*** 
Intercept 0.1840*** 0.1817*** 0.1678** 0.1644** 0.2070*** 0.2066*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.1296 0.1342 0.1105 0.1105 0.185 0.1842 







 Table 7 Panel D 
Unsigned DISD2 Positive DISD2 Negative DISD2 
CH/AT CH/AT CH/AT CH/AT CH/AT CH/AT 
DISD2 0.0003*** 0.0002***         
Oveconf_dummy 0.0022   0.0018   -0.0003   
DISD2*Overconf. 0.0003**           
DISD2*High_over   0.0002         
DISD2*Low_over   0.0001         
High_over    -0.0152**   -0.0095   -0.0205*** 
Low_over   0.0033   -0.0043   0.0046 
Ceo tenure(n-1) -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
Ln(sales)(n-1) -0.0082*** -0.0086*** -0.0097*** -0.0098*** -0.0075*** -0.0076*** 
MB(n-1) 0.0155*** 0.0175*** 0.0224*** 0.0230*** 0.0146*** 0.0153*** 
ROA(n-1) 0.0026 -0.0142 -0.0977*** -0.0967*** 0.0379*** 0.0374*** 
PPE_at(n-1) -0.0458*** -0.0465*** -0.0477*** -0.0480*** -0.0456*** -0.0456*** 
RD_at(n-1) 0.5334*** 0.5385*** 0.5836*** 0.5782*** 0.4989*** 0.4963*** 
Stock return(n-1) -0.0337*** -0.0242*** -0.002 -0.0005 -0.0404*** -0.0404*** 
BCL dummy(n-1) 0.0017 0.0148 -0.0027 -0.001 0.0431* 0.0430* 
Board size(n-1) -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0028*** -0.0029*** 
Intercept 0.1824*** 0.1697*** 0.1832*** 0.1836*** 0.1368*** 0.1377*** 
Industry fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj r2 0.2463 0.2529 0.3033 0.3037 0.226 0.2279 
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Appendix 2.A: Variable definitions 
 
Ch_at: Cash scale by book value of total assets. 
Size: natural log of book value of assets. 
Divdummy: Dividend dummy set to 1 if the company pays dividend otherwise zero. 
Cashflow: calculated as: EBITDA-interest-taxes- common dividends, and then scale by total 
assets. 
Nwcap: net working capital is net working capital minus cash and marketable securities and 
then scale by 
total assets. 
Capx_TA: capital expenditures scaled by total assets. 
Leverage: market debt ratio calculated by book value of liability/market value of asset. 
MB: market to book ratio of assets: (book liabilities + market value of equity)/total assets. 
Rddummy: R&D dummy set to one if firm did not report R&D expenses. 
Rd_ta: R&D expense scale by total assets. 
Lnta: log of asset size, measured in 1983 dollars. 
Dep-at: depreciation (Compustat item [14]) as a proportion of total assets 
Overceo: overconfident CEO dummy set to one if CEO consider as overconfident. 
Delaware: Delaware dummy set to one is the firm incorporated in Delaware otherwise 0. 
After95: after 95 dummy set to one for firm years after 1995, and zero otherwise. 
BCL: BCL dummy set to one if firm incorporated in a stat and in a year that business 
combination law has passed. 
Sales growth rate: The ratio of total sales (revt) in year t to total sales in year t-1. 
Firm Equity: Market value of firm equity 
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Firm debt: Current debt and long-term debt of firms 
CEO age: The age of the CEO at fiscal year t. 
CEO tenure: CEO tenure is the number of years that the current CEO has served in that 
capacity as reported in the ExecuComp database. 
CEO equity: Sum of the value of stock and stock option. 
CEO debt: Sum of the present value ofa ccumulated pension benefits and deferred 
compensation as reported in Execucomp. 
CEO debt to equity ratio: CEO debt divided by CEO equity 
CEO relative leverage ratio (k): CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio divided by the firm’s debt-to-
equity ratio. 
CEO relative incentive ratio (k*):  the ratio of the marginal change in the value of CEO 
inside debt holdings to the marginal change in CEO inside equity holdings given the change 
in firm value, all scaled by the firm’s respective ratio. 
DISD1: Actual k ratio minus the optimal k ratio 




Appendix 2.B. Estimating Option value 
 
Estimates of a stock option’s value or sensitivity to stock price or stock-return volatility are 
calculated based on the Black–Scholes (1973) formula for valuing European call options but 
modified to account for dividend payouts following Merton (1973). 
 
 
N = Cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = Underlying stock price 
X = Option exercise price 
T = Time to maturity of the option (in years) 
d = Natural log of expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
r = Natural log of risk-free interest rate 
σ = Expected stock return volatility over the life of the option 
 
We follow Core and Guay (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2007) to estimate the value of 
unexercised options held by executives (i.e., options granted in previous years whose value is not 
reported). The inputs are obtained as follows: 
i) Exercise price for unexercised options: To estimate the average exercise price 
forunexercised exercisable options, We follow a two-step process. First, Wecompute 
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the ratio of the realizable value of in-the-money exercisable options and the number 
of unexercised exercisable options. Second, We subtract this ratio from the fiscal 
yearend stock price. The resulting number is an estimate of the average exercise price 
for unexercised exercisable options held by executives. Similarly, an estimate of the 
average exercise price of unexercised unexercisable options can be obtained by 
subtracting the ratio of in-the-money unexercisable options to the number of 
unexercised unexercisable options from the fiscal year-end stock price. 
ii) Option maturity for unexercised exercisable options: The maturity of unexercised 
exercisable options is assumed to be 4 years less than the average maturity of the new 
grants. In case no grants are made this year, the maturity is set at 6 years. The 
maturity of unexercisable options is set at 1 less than the average maturity of the new 
grants. In case no grants are made this year, the maturity is set at 9 years. 
iii) Stock price, risk-free rate, dividend yield, and volatility: These inputs are obtained 




Appendix 2.C. Fama French 1998 firm value variables 
 
We estimate regressions using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Each regression 
includes cross-sections. Xt is the level of variable X in year t divided by the of assets in year t. 
dXt is the change in the level of X from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets year t ((Xt - Xt-
1)/At). A is the book value of assets. dXt-1, is the change in the level of X from year t+1 divided 
by assets in year t ((Xt 1 - Xt)/At). V is the market value of the equity plus the value of debt. E is 
earnings defined as earnings before extraordinary items plus interest plus deferred tax credits 
plus investment tax credits. NA is net assets, which is defined as total assets minus RD is 
research and development expense. When R&D is missing, it is set to zero. I is interest expense. 
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